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PREFACE
On April 1, 1918, in the midst of a long and bloody
war the British government organized a new military service* 
Three years earlier the war had become stalemated in the 
trenches of France and successive, mammoth, grinding battles 
had succeeded only in destroying the youth of a generation. - 
Partly in reaction to this trench-bound war of mud and 
misery the British turned to a new weapon which fought in 
the clean and free environment of the sky.
The new military service was the Royal Air Force.
It combined all existing air units of the Royal Navy and 
the British Army into one new force, and made this force an 
independent agency of the government. For the first time, 
the skies were formally recognized as an arena for battle, 
the airplane was recognized as a weapon which could range 
and fight over all of an enemy nation, and airmen were 
acknowledged sole proprietors of a new military force— a 
force not tied in any way to traditional roles on the ground 
or at sea.
iii
Great Britain was the only combatant in the first 
World War to form an independent air force. Great— and 
varied— significance has been attached to this fact. 
Advocates have long considered it an essential milestone 
in the evolution of air power. Detractors, still today, 
lament the decision."^ However, not the decision to form 
the separate service, but what lay behind the decision is 
the subject of this study. There were many reasons, both 
political and military. Some carried great weight; others 
were minor. An understanding of these, I believe, is as 
important to the student of the history of air power as 
the theories of Douhet, Mitchell, or Trenchard.
I acknowledge with gratitude the debt which I owe 
to all members of the Department of History of the Univer­
sity of Omaha who have guided me. My special debt is to 
Dr. A. Stanley Trickett, Chairman of the Department, who 
has led me to a sense of history and to an understanding 
of historiography.
^See, for example, Captain Donald MacIntyre, R. N. , 
(Ret.), "Point of No Return, 1 U. S. Institute of Naval 
Proceedings, XIIIC, No. 2, (Feb. 1964), 37ff.
iv
I wish also to acknowledge the help of Group Captain 
John Garden, Royal Air Force, who was kind enough to criti­
cize an early draft of this paper; and, finally, I must 
extend my thanks to the unsung heroes of every researcher's 
battle, the librarians of the University of Omaha and Offutt 
Air Force Base libraries, without whose assistance my 
research could not have been completed.
PAUL C. PHILLIPS
Omaha, Nebraska 
November 1965
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CHAPTER I
THE- BEGINNING: BALLOONS TO AIRPLANES
In the early dawn of July 25, 1909, a daring French 
aviator took to the air from a field at Les Baraques, near 
Calais. He was flying a small, frail monoplane of his own 
design, powered by a twenty-five horsepower Anzani engine. 
When he landed thirty-six minutes later in the Northfall 
Meadow by Dover Castle, he had become the first man to fly 
across the English channel, had won the prize of a thousand 
pounds sterling offered by the Daily Mail, and had destroyed 
the insularity of the British nation.'*'
The French pilot wa~s Louis Bleriot, and his flight 
cast a long, but strangely obscure shadow across the course, 
of British military history. The length of the shadow led 
directly to the air battle which, thirty years later, was to 
pose for the British nation one of its gravest threats, -and 
to provide one of its finest hours. The obscurity of the
1. Charles H. Gibbs-Smith, The Aeroplane: An Histori 
cal Survey of Its Origins and Development (London: Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, I960), p. 69.
1
2shadow was mirrored in the minds of those military leaders
who, for many years, failed to see the importance of the
airplane and how it had destroyed England's traditional first
line of defense, the sea.
British interest in military aviation can be traced to
1879 when a Balloon School was established at Chatham to
instruct the Royal Engineers in military aeronautics. This
school was the first attempt in Great Britain to exploit
2
the air for military purposes. The first battlefield use
of balloons by the Army was in the Sudan in 1885, but the
3
results were minor in the over-all operation.
The next major step forward came during the Aldershot 
maneuvers held in 1889. During the maneuvers, a late evening 
reconnaissance by balloons led to the discovery of vital 
intelligence on the movement of opposing troops. As a re­
sult, a successful night attack was launched and the balloons
2. Noble Frankland, A Short History of the Royal Air 
Force: Air Ministry Pamphlet 348 (London: Air Ministry,
1958), p. 3. This school was established almost 100 years 
after the first balloon experiments by the MongoIfier bro­
thers in France in 1782-83. The French had pursued military, 
uses of balloons and had formed a "Compagnie de Aerostiers" 
who were employed against the Austrians in 1794. See C v F- 
Snowden Gamble, The Air Weapon (3 vols.; London: Humphrey 
Milford, 1931), I, 8-17.
3. J. A. Chamier, The Birth of the Royal Air Force 
(London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd., 1943), p. 1.
3gained new respect. Following the maneuvers, the Army
4formed special air sections.
Balloons were next used in the South African War, but 
their efforts did little to change traditional military think­
ing as to their value. Leaders at both the War Office and 
the Admiralty were, in fact, so opposed to exploiting the 
air as a military medium that they refused several oppor­
tunities to investigate a new and exciting invent ion of two
5
American brothers, the airplane.
In 1908, A. V. Roe made the first airplane flight in 
England. However, when he, along with other pioneer airmen, 
asked the War Office for financial help to build airplanes, 
they were told by Colonel J. E. Seeley, the assistant to the 
Secretary of State for War, that the Government could not 
encourage aviation because, "we do not consider that aero­
planes will be of any possible use for war p u r p o s e s .
Between 1909 and 1911, and despite the lesson of 
Bleriot's flight, British heavier-than-air military aviation 
was limited solely to the efforts of individual officers.
These officers flew at their own expense and with little
4 - Ibid. 5. Ibid., p. 2.
Ibid. See also Edward Lanchbery, A. V. Roe 
(London: The Bodley Head, 1956), p. 91.
4official encouragement. Captain Bertram Dickson was the 
first British military officer to fly. He did so in a Henri 
Farman machine that had been purchased in France. In 1910, 
he was permitted to fly the airplane, at his own expense, 
during British Army maneuvers. His appearance led to bitter 
protests by Cavalrymen who claimed his only purpose was to 
frighten their horses. When some flights were cancelled 
because of adverse weather, the sceptics used the cancella- 
tions to cast doubt on the value of military aviation. In 
February, 1911, in spite of the earlier problems, The Balloon
o
School became the Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers.
Aviation continued to develop rapidly in Europe 
throughout 1911. By November, the Prime Minister, looking 
to the future, asked the standing sub-committee of the Com-, 
mittee of Imperial Defence to review the status Qf British 
aviation. The Committee, under the chairmanship of Lord 
Haldane, was asked to consider all aspects of the future 
development of aerial navigation for naval and military pur­
poses. In addition, the Committee was to recommend measures 
to provide an efficient British air service in coming years.
7. Chamier, p. 4. See also Gamble, I, 144.
8. Frankland, p. 3.
5Out of the Committee's deliberations came a proposal
to remove the air arm from the Royal Engineers and form a
British aeronautical service, The Committee recommended that
this new service be made up of a Naval Wing, a Military Wing,
and a Central Flying School for the training of pilots. It
should, said the Committee, be called the Flying Corps, At
the same time a permanent consultative body, to be called the
Air Committee, should be established within the Government to
deal with all aeronautical questions affecting both the
9Admiralty and the War Office,
The Haldane Committee's recommendations received quick 
approval from the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, The Govern­
ment recognized that the ultimate air missions of the Army 
and the Navy would be different, but felt that the separate 
Military and Naval Wings would permit proper development for 
both services. On April 13, 1912, a Royal Warrant was granted 
constituting the Royal Flying Corps, and on April 25, the 
Committee of Imperial Defence approved a final plan of organ­
ization. The R. F, C. was actually born on May 13, a single 
service with separate Naval and Military Wings. The Naval ..
9. Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones, War in the Air 
(6 vols. and appendices; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1922-
37), I, 190,
6Wing was to be serviced and administered by the Admiralty, 
the Military Wing by the War Office. The Flying School was 
jointly supported by both organizations»
The strange new stepchild of the proud and distin­
guished British military services slipped into the world 
almost unnoticed. To the tradition-minded officers of the 
British Army and Royal Navy, who were aware of its coming, it 
was "just another craze for the shortsighted c r a n k . T h e .
opposition of some military leaders to the extension of war-
12fare into a new dimension "amounted almost to mania." The
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir William
Nicholson, considered aviation a useless and expensive fad,
while another senior Army officer stated that modern war
was already sufficiently complicated without the addition of 
13the airplane. The Army had no monopoly upon shortsighted­
ness. Proposals to use airplanes for reconnaissance work for
the fleet were rejected by the Sea Lords at the Admiralty with
14little or no consideration.
10. Frankland, p. 4.
11. Andrew Boyle, Trenchard (London: Collins, 1962),
p. 99.
12. F. H. Sykes, From Many Angles (London: George C. 
Harrap & Company Ltd., 1942), p. 91
13. Ibid. See also Percy R. C. Groves, Behind the 
Smoke Screen (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1934), pp. 109-10.
14. Murray F. Sueter, Airmen or Noahs: Fair Play for
Our Airmen (London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd., 1928),
p. xxvi.
7Despite the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the 
traditional military services, a War Office Committee under 
the leadership of Brigadier General David Henderson took con­
trol of the nucleus which had grown up under the Royal Engi­
neers and began making plans to complete the Royal Flying 
Corps, By June, 1913, a Military Aeronautics Directorate 
was formed in the War Office with the Director General 
reporting to the Secretary of State for War, The R. F. C. 
organization now included, in addition to the Military and 
Naval Wings and the Central Flying School, the Royal Air­
craft Factory at Farnborough, and an Aeronautical Inspection 
15Department,
With operational control remaining the responsibility 
of the traditional services, the need for a coordinating 
organization was apparent. This organization was the Air 
Committee, The Committee was formed in July, 1912, with 
Colonel Seeley, by this time the Secretary of State for War, 
as its chairman. The vice-chairman was Sir John Jellicoe, a 
Vice-Admiral and the Second Sea Lord, The other members were 
Brigadier General David Henderson, the Director of Military 
Training at the War Office; Captain Murray F. Sueter of the
15, Raleigh and Jones, I, 415-16,
8Royal Navy? Captain G. A. Gallard, the Director of the Opera­
tions Division, War Staff, Admiralty; Captain G. M. Paine, 
the Commandant of the Central Flying School; Commander C. R . ' 
Samson, Officer Commanding the Naval Wing, Royal Flying Corps; 
Major F. H. Sykes, Officer Commanding the Military Wing,
Royal Flying Corps; Mervyn O'Gorman, the Superintendent of 
the Royal Aircraft Factory; N. E. Behrens, representing the
Treasury; and Captain M» P. A. Hankey, member of the Committee
16of Imperial Defence, who acted as Secretary.
The Committee's primary function was consultative, and 
it had great value as a meeting place for the leaders of 
British military aviation. Major problems common to all ele­
ments of the Royal Flying Corps could be dealt with by this 
body. However, it had no executive powers, and while it 
could advise, all decisions were still made at the Admiralty 
or the War Office.17
Plans for the Military Wing called for an organization 
of seven airplane squadrons, each to be equipped with twelve- 
aircraft. There was also to be a kite and airship squadron 
and a communications element. The airship squadron was
16. Gamble, I, 183, n. 1.
17. Raleigh and Jones, I, 212.
9formed first, at Farnborough. Next came an airplane squad­
ron, also formed at Farnborough, followed by other airplane 
squadrons at Salisbury Plain and at Netheravon.
Major operational emphasis in the Military Wing was 
on reconnaissanceo Only the most visionary airmen could anti­
cipate other, greater, and far more significant roles for the 
airplane in war. With a European war rapidly approaching, 
the Army saw its infant air arm as an extension of the tradi­
tional eyes and ears of the Cavalry. The immediate success 
of airplane reconnaissance during Army maneuvers soon proved
it was far. more than an extension of the Cavalry. It was its
18logical, and much more capable, successor.
Despite these initial successes, however, appropria­
tions for the Royal Flying Corps in 1912 and 1913 amounted to
19"barely half a million pounds sterling." The size of this
18. Chamier, p. 9. The most notable successes of air­
craft in the reconnaissance role came during Army maneuvers
in East Anglia in 1912, and during the "Concentration Camp" 
maneuvers at Netheravon in 1914. At East Anglia, twenty-four 
airplanes and one airship flew a total of 7,855 miles scouting 
for the Army. The Director of Military Operations at the War 
-Office recognized the contribution of the airplane when he 
said: "There can no longer be any doubt as to the value of 
airships and aeroplanes in locating an enemy on land and 
obtaining information which could otherwise only be obtained 
by force." Cited in "Fifty Years of Military Aviation, 1912- 
1962, " a Chronology published by the Air Ministry. (London: 
1962), p. 2.
19. Boyle, p. 108.
10
sum meant that Henderson could spend no money for research
and development and very little for aircraft procurement. As
a result, private manufacturing slumped and, in the spring of
1913 with the war ever closer, the Military Wing could Rarely
20equip one squadron on a combat footing. C. G. Grey,
editor of The Aeroplane magazine was forced to admit in his 
end-of-the-year review that "as a whole, Great Britain is a 
bad third to France and Germany . . . "  in military avia­
tion. ^
The Naval Wing's operational mission was much less 
well defined. The new addition to Britain's traditional first 
line of defense began life with only twelve aircraft. No 
more were to be purchased until research could prove aircraft 
useful as an adjunct to the fleet. This research program 
quickly led to flights from the sea on float-equipped air­
craft, and, shortly after, to the first flights from the 
deck of a moving ship. These were made from the battleship 
Hibernia, steaming at ten-and-a-half knots. A Short hiplane, 
equipped with a seventy horsepower Gnome engine, took off 
from a platform built over the ship's forecastle. The plane
20. Ibid.
21. The Aeroplane, January 1, 1914, p. 3.
22was piloted by Commander C. R. Samson. A Naval aviator
also carried out the first experiment in simulated bombing.
Lieutenant Robert Gregory released a 300-pound weight from
his aircraft and found, to his great relief, that it did not
23change the basic stability of the craft. The Naval Wing 
also began.to reinvestigate the use of airships, and carried 
out the first attempts to communicate between the ground and 
an airborne aircraft by means of wireless telegraphy.
During 1912, the Air Committee decided to build five 
stations along the east coast of Scotland and England to be 
operated by the Naval Wing. These stations were for airships 
and airplanes working with the Fleet at sea.
Late in 1912, activities of the Naval Wing were with­
drawn from the supervision of the Director of Naval Ordinance, 
and an "Air Department" was formed by the Board of Admiralty. 
Captain Murray Sueter, a pioneer aviator, was made its 
director, A weakness which was to have far-reaching results
22. In December, 1911, Samson, then a Lieutenant, 
became the first man to fly from a ship when he took off in 
a Short biplane from a plafform built on the deck of the 
Africa. The ship was anchored in Sheerness Harbor at the 
time. See Gamble, pp. 159-60.
23. Ibid., pp. 180-81.
24. Ibid., p. 183. Airship development in the Navy 
had been halted in 1911 following the disaster of the Mayfly, 
a poorly built, rigid airship which was destroyed before her 
first flight.
12
was built into the organization at this time when Sueter was
made responsible to all the various Sea Lords for different
parts of his job- He was required, for example, to report
to the First Sea Lord on matters of employment and tactics,
to the Second Sea Lord on personnel and training problems,
and to the Third Sea Lord on questions of supply and materiel.
It was soon apparent that he was required to serve too many 
25masters»
Research and experiments by the Naval airmen con­
tinued, but acceptance of the use of aircraft by the senior 
officers of the fleet was virtually non-existent. The Admir­
alty staff thought the airplane had possible future importance, 
but little present value for war. Winston Churchill, the 
First Sea Lord, foresaw development of aircraft which could 
play a defensive role, could scout at sea, and could repel 
enemy airships- But the Naval leaders who stood to gain the 
most from the new weapon, the sea force commanders, almost 
to a man refused to recognize its existence.^
25. Ibid., pp. 201-202.
26. Criticism of the Admiralty and its shortsighted 
air policy was not confined to the years before the war, but 
continued throughout the period under study. Writing in
The Aeroplane on March 13, 1918, C. G. Grey commented: "Every­
one fully recognizes the magnificent work done by units of the 
Royal Naval Air Service, especially when they have formed 
practically independent commands under young and energetic
13
As the two wings ofv the Royal Flying Corps began to
cautiously advance their military usefulness by small steps
at the cost of experiment and investigation, they began to
diverge in purpose and direction. The first major dividing
point was the Royal Aircraft Factory. This organization, a
part of the R. F. C ., was charged primarily with performing
experimental work, the testing of aircraft and engines, and .
27general research into the realm of flight. However, due
largely to the aggressive leadership of its superintendent, . 
Mervyn O'Gorman, the factory soon began manufacturing air­
craft. When one of these, the B. E. 2, proved superior to 
all others for military purposes during the Military Aero­
plane Trials, the factory and O'Gorman quickly earned the 
enmity of the private aircraft builders. The Military Wing, 
equipping its squadrons with the B. E. 2, turned more and 
more to the Royal Aircraft Factory for its aircraft. The 
Naval Wing, pursuing a wide range of experimental programs, 
relied almost entirely upon private aircraft manufacturers. 
This apparent dichotomy was to prove later to be the greatest
officers, but wherever the influence of the Admiralty has 
been felt in the past in connection with aviation the effect 
has been truly lamentable."
27. The charter of the Royal Aircraft Factory was 
stated in the Royal Warrant of April 13, 1912.
of blessings. But it was the beginning of a lengthy and
28torrid debate which was carried on for years.
Only at the Central Flying School on Salisbury Plain
where Navy Captain G. M. Paine commanded, assisted by Major
Hugh M. Trenchard, was there unity of purpose in the two
different groups which made up the R. F. C. Paine, an early
airman who had been released by the Navy to run the school,
drafted Trenchard from the student body to be his assistant.
Trenchard, a forty-year-old Major, had battled official
Army disapproval of his age as well as his own poor health
to learn to fly. In drafting him, Paine pointed out that
there were three times as many Army as Navy students in the
school, and an Army Adjutant was urgently needed. Trenchard
attached the job with a characteristic firmness of purpose,
adapting the best procedures from the regulations of both 
29
services. Paine and Trenchard worked smoothly together,
28. Virtually every issue the author examined of 
The Aeroplane magazine covering the years 1914 through 1918 
contained an attach on the Royal Aircraft Factory. These 
ranged from innuendoes and sly comments to all-out attacks 
and accusations of criminal neglect in connection with air­
craft accidents. The Aeroplane was the principal trade 
publication of the time? hence, the attacks must be judged 
carefully. As the issues of C. G. Grey's magazine became 
progressively fatter, primarily with the advertisements of 
aircraft manufacturers, his attacks on the Royal Aircraft 
Factory became more scathing.
29. Boyle, pp. 96-100.
15
and the school functioned well and produced aviators for both 
Wings of the Royal Flying Corps.30
A problem of divided command was inherent in the 
original organization of the Royal Flying Corps, and there 
was no force in the early days to hold it together. The most 
important question was whether control of the air service 
should be invested in the Air Committee or should remain with 
the War Office and the Admiralty. As we have seen, the Air 
Committee had advisory powers only. The Admiralty, holding 
operational control, was quick to establish full jurisdiction 
over the Naval Wing. The Haldane Committee's recommendation, 
approved by the Cabinet, was that the "British Aeronautical 
Service /should7 . . .  be regarded as one and . . . desig­
nated 'The Flying Corps'." But the Admiralty did not support
,-i . j . . 31this decision.
After a few references in official documents to the
"Royal Flying Corps, Naval Wing, " the title was quickly -
dropped from use, and the Admiralty began using the title
32"The Royal Naval Air Service. " Continued independent
30. The Navy, however, never ceased training pilots, 
at its independent school at Eastchurch. See W. E. deB. 
Whittaker, "The Royal Flying Corps in 1913, " The Aeroplane, 
January 1, 1914, p. 13.
31. Chamier, p. 8. See also Gamble, I, 266.
32. Raleigh and Jones# I# 206.
16
action on the part of the Admiralty led, in July, 1914; to 
official recognition of the Royal Naval Air Service as an 
independent organization, with a constitution of its own and
complete jurisdiction over the separate Naval flying school
at Eastchurch and the air stations on the coast. A decision 
made by a government committee, approved by the Cabinet and 
confirmed by a Royal Warrant, had been reversed by the uni­
lateral action of a powerful and independent Government 
department. As a result, the fledgling air service approached 
the summer of the European war split into two sickly and
divided forces. "Such was the political power of the
A<3miralty.
33. Gamble, I, 266.
CHAPTER II
AIR BATTLES AND AIR BOARDS
The Royal Plying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Ser­
vice entered the First World War on eager wings, but with 
untried and ill-equipped forces. The ambitious plans made 
in 1912 for a Flying Corps of eight squadrons equipped with 
3 00 airplanes and manned by 300 pilots had foundered on the 
rocks of government economy. Instead of eight full-strength 
squadrons, there were four squadrons, all still being organ­
ized. Less than 100 serviceable aircraft were available, 
and considerably fewer than 100 trained and qualified 
pilots could be called upon."*' The Royal Aircraft Factory 
was producing about two airplanes per month, and the produc­
tion of private builders was even more limited. These air­
craft were hand-constructed by skilled workmen. No satis­
factory aircraft engine had ever been produced in Britain.
1. Norman MacMillan, Sir Sefton Brancker (London; 
William Heinemann Ltd., 1935), p. 54. L. G. S. Payne in his 
excellent compilation, Air Dates (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, Inc., 1957), p. 20, says that immediately before the 
war Britain had 179 aircraft, France had about 1,500, and 
Germany had 1,000. These are total airplanes, not necessarily 
military aircraft.
17
18
Nowhere in the country was there the type of manufacturing
2experience required to build and supply a combat air force*
As soon as the war beqan, General Henderson left his
post in the Military Aeronautics Directorate of the War
Office and took command of the R. F. C. in the field. Major
Sykes, who had commanded the Military Wing, became Henderson's
Chief of Staff, and Major Sefton Brancker was appointed
Henderson's deputy to take charge at home in the Military
Aeronautics Directorate. Sykes was replaced in the Military
Wing by Major Hugh Trenchard who had been second in command
at the Central Flying School.
Henderson stripped the flying school of aircraft and
pilots and gathered every other airworthy airplane he could
find. His efforts brought together a force of sixty-three
aircraft which flew the channel to France for duty with the
3
Army Expeditionary Force.
2. MacMillan, Brancker, p. 55.
3. F. H. Sykes, Aviation in Peace and War (London: 
Edward Arnold & Co., 1922), p. 45. Sykes says the home force 
was so completely stripped because "we considered it essen­
tial to dispatch at once to France every available machine 
and pilot, because both political and military authorities 
were of the opinion that for economic and financial reasons
a war with a great European power could not last more than 
a few months."
19
Trenchard and Brancker, left behind, were faced with 
the immediate and very serious problem of finding aircraft 
and instructors to train new pilots., In addition, replacement 
aircraft and pilots were needed to join the units in France.. 
The two men made a valiant assault on their supply problems, 
using unorthodox methods, commandeering what they needed, 
and continually prodding the Royal Aircraft Factory. They 
began to slowly piece together a training force.
Brancker almost immediately found that he was having 
trouble obtaining needed raw materials for the Royal Aircraft 
Factory. The Royal Naval Air Service, using the vast purchas­
ing power of the Admiralty, was rapidly buying up the avail­
able supply of many scarce materials for private manufacturers. 
Private builders were turning out some good new equipment,
<o
but the Government factory was still the primary supplier
4for the R. F. C. The War Office, falling continually 
behind in its own ambitious supply program for the ground 
forces, had little concern for the needs of the young flying 
corps, and Brancker was left to battle for the needed mater­
ials on his own.
4. Andrew Boyle, Trenchard (London: Collins, 1962),
p. 13 7. See also Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones, War in the 
Air (6 vols. and appendices; Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1922-37) I, 169.
Meanwhile, in France, Henderson's young force drew its
first blood on August 25. Three unarmed aircraft of the
Number 2 Squadron, spotting an opposing German scout, downed
the enemy airplane by flying round and round above it until
5
the pilot was forced to land.
All activity of the Royal Flying Corps in France was 
linked directly to the fluctuating fortunes of the ground 
forces. The Squadrons of the Military Wing were organized 
to support the Army, and they immediately began reconnaissance 
missions over the rapidly shifting battlefront.^ As the
British Army retreated before the hard-driving German attack, 
the Squadrons of the R. F. C. retreated also. Pilots took 
off to fly over the nearby front and returned to find their 
operating base being moved rapidly back to a new location.
The broad operational potential of the new weapon was 
quickly exploited. By September, the pilots of the R. F. C. 
were using wireless telegraphy communications to direct 
artillery batteries at the battle of the Aisne. Observers
5. Payne, p. 20.
6. The first reconnaissance mission of the war was
flown from Maubeuge on August 19. Taking part were Captain 
P. Joubert de la Ferte of the No. 3 Squadron in a Bleriot, 
and Lieutenant G. W. Mapplebeck of the No. 4 Squadron in a
B. E. 2. See "Fifty Years of Military Aviation, 1912-1962,"
A Chronology published by the Air Ministry. (London: 1962),
p. 3.
began talcing photographs of battle lines and enemy fortifi-_ 
cations, the beginnings of aerial photography. Also in 
September, the first Maurice Farman two-seat pusher biplane 
equipped with a machine gun arrived in France. Its appear-, 
ance heralded the end of the early cavalier air battles in 
which passing pilots fired at each other with their service 
pistols.^
By the end of November, it was apparent that the 
R. F. C. would have to expand to match the growth of the Army 
ground force. On November 29, the original Military Wing 
was disbanded and new Wings were formed in France to be 
attached to each Army Corps. The Farnborough Squadrons, the 
Depot, the Aircraft Park, and the Record Office at home were 
grouped together as the Administrative Wing.^
The untried new force had come through its first 
tests with great courage and had begun to forge the tactics 
with which to fight this strange type of war. The Army was 
beginning to accept the value of the airplane for artillery . 
spotting and for reconnaissance. The reorganization tied the 
air weapon ever closer to the Army and the ground mission.
But thoughtful men were beginning to question if the new 
weapon was being well and wisely used.
7. Ibid. 8. Ibid.
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As the second year of the war began, the pilots of the
R. F. C. continued to experiment and develop new tactics. In
January, the first Experimental Photographic Section was
formed under Lieutenant J. T. C. Moore-Brabazon. By March,
this new technology had advanced so quickly that the assault
on Neuve Chapelle was based entirely on maps prepared from
g
photographic reconnaissance.
On March 10, the first interdiction air bombing took
place when R. F. C. aircraft attacked the railways at
Courtrai, Menin, Lille, Douai, and Don with twenty-five and
one-hundred pound bombs. The objective of the attacks was
to delay the advance of enemy reinforcements.^
Supply problems, particularly shortages of shells and
ammunition, began in early 1915 to plague all the British
military forces. The R. F. C., attempting to organize new
squadrons as rapidly as possible and to simultaneously replace
the combat losses which were growing larger daily, was having
11great difficulty. In August, 1915, Lieutenant Colonel
9. Moore-Brabazon, in his light-hearted autobiography 
The Brabazon Story (London: William Hcinemann Ltd., 1956),
p. 63, claims he was given the responsibility because he was 
the only knowledgeable amateur photographer in his squadron.
10. "Fifty Years of Military Aviation," p. 3. Inter­
diction here is used to describe any attack designed to halt 
the movement of supplies or reinforcements to the front lines.
11. Air Commodore J. A. Chamier, remembering these 
days during World War II in The Birth of the Royal Air Force
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Robert Brooke-Popham, who had replaced Sykes as Chief of
Staff in France, wrote a memorandum which surveyed the -entire
problem. He pointed out that while the Army Expeditionary
Force had grown from four divisions to thirty during the
first year of the war, the R« F. C. had increased only from
four squadrons to eleven. And this, he said, was despite
the air weapon's ever-expanding role. He wrote:
If the enemy brings troops over from the Eastern front 
and resumes his offensive, he will doubtless make a 
determined effort to prevent our discovering his move­
ments. Then will commence the real struggle for air
supremacy where numbers will be one of the essentials 1 o
of success.
Something, obviously, had to be done. On August 19, 
Henderson, the R. F. C.'s most senior officer, selected 
Trenchard as his successor and returned to the War Office 
to do battle over the problems of men and material for the 
expanding air service.
Trenchard's concept of air warfare was to maintain a 
constant offensive at all costs. He believed that only by
(London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., 1943), p. 63, says:
"The early stages of the war were fought mainly on French 
machines and entirely on French engines and German magnetos; 
and the R. N. A. S. entered into direct competition with the 
R. F. C. for these French supplies. Not only did friction 
arise, but the French themselves were hard put to it to supply 
their own requirements. For example, of 150 LeRhone engines 
ordered for the last quarter of 1915, only ten were delivered."
12. Raleigh and Jones, II, 143.
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continually attacking the opposing forces, maintaining con­
stant patrols, and by operating to the greatest extent pos­
sible behind the enemy lines could the airplane be an 
effective weapon. He immediately began to instill this 
belief in his commanders and in the pilots of the R. F‘. C.
It was the root of his statement on future air policy, 
issued from his Advanced Headquarters in France on September 
22, 1916. In it he said:
The sound policy • . • which should guide all warfare 
in the air would seem to be this: to exploit . . •
/the7 moral£ej effect of the aeroplane on the enemy, 
but not to let him exploit it on ourselves. Now this . 
can only be done by attacking and by continuing to 
attack. ^
13o The entire statement is published as Appendix IX 
of Raleigh and Jones, II, 472-74. Trenchard's constant 
offensive doctrine has been severely criticized by his con­
temporaries, writing after the war. Sykes says*, in From Many 
Angles (London: George G. Harrap & Company Ltd., 1942), p.
220, that "Trenchard had been an exponent of the battering- 
ram tactics beloved by G. H. Q. and kept up a continuous 
offensive. Spectacular dog fights over the German lines 
achieved little strategic effect and resulted in grave 
losses." Sholto Douglas, who served as a Squadron Commander 
in France under Trenchard and later became a senior R. A. F. 
Commander, says in Years of Combat (London: Collins, 1963),
pp. 179-80, that "that magnificent eagerness of Trenchard1s 
to use the air for offence against the enemy led him, quite 
unintentionally, to make greater demands on the new pilots 
than were justified. . . .  I have always felt that we would 
have been much better off if we had had fewer squadrons 
manned by pilots who were better trained and who had greater 
experience? and quite a few of us who served on the western 
front and who were later to become senior commanders of the 
Royal Air Force felt the same way about Trenchard's policy
25
Trenchard's doctrine of the constant offensive placed 
new and unprecedented demands upon the young flying service. 
Coming, as it did, with the introduction of a new German 
fighter--the Fokker— it brought the R. F. C. to its darkest 
hour of the war. To provide the offensive force needed to 
keep up continuous pressure on the Germans, Trenchard demanded 
more and more squadrons. These demands could only be met by 
shortening the training period in England for pilots, and by 
increasing pressure upon the Royal Aircraft Factory to pro­
duce more aircraft. These were the conditions when the 
Germans introduced the Fokker to the air battle over the 
trenches. The superiority of this German single-seat fighter 
was felt immediately. It was based on a striking technological
of driving so hard and almost regardless of cost." Chamier,- 
p. 199, says: "The doctrine of the offensive, associated
forever with the name of Trenchard, was the correct one from 
the point of view of morale as well as of material results, 
but an active offensive in the air at all times and places 
regardless of need or object was a stupidity for which we 
paid dearly in lives." General Percy R. C. Groves in Behind 
the Smoke Screen (London: Faber and Faber, Limited, 1934),
p. 124, calls the sending of inadequately trained pilots to 
the front "the most pitiful of all the hidden scandals of the 
war." Groves maintains that Trenchard's offensive policy led 
to the sacrifice of untrained pilots, and the excessive 
losses of men and aircraft for no significant purpose. He 
says that because of the R. F. C.'s loss rate of three-to- 
one as opposed to the Germans, the shortage of aircraft was 
aggravated and the day when they could be used for a 
strategic offensive was further delayed.
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development— the ability to fire a machine gun straight for­
ward, through the propellor. The unhappy combination of the 
superior new German fighter and of Trenchard's hurriedly 
trained pilots brought soaring casualty rates to the R. F. C.
This situation continued until May, 1916, when the 
first group of Sopwith one-and-one-half Strutter two-seat 
fighters was sent to France/ This high-performance aircraft 
was built for the Naval Wing under its policy of encouraging 
development by private contractors. It could fire forward 
through the propellor and also from a Lewis gun mounted in 
the rear seat. With its appearance, the balance was slowly 
re-established.^
Trenchard further decentralized the organization of 
the R. F. C. in January, 1916, when each Army in France was 
allotted two Wings, organized as an Air Brigade. One wing 
was to carry out routine Army Corps work and the other to
14. The story of the Fokker ascendancy is, of course, 
too large to be more than touched upon in this paper. 
Interestingly, Admiral Mark Kerr in his Land, Sea and Air 
(London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1927), pp. 180-81,
gives much credit to the individual efforts of the great 
war ace, Albert Ball, in countering the morale effects of 
the Fokker. He says: "Ball, in his old machine, with his
Wonderful genius for flying and straight shooting, proceeded 
to change the atmosphere of doubt and fear. . . . He took on
the Fokker singly or in numbers, and shot them down without 
fear or favour. . . . Our morale was restored and we held
our position in the air until the advent of our new machines."
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15conduct the fighting, bombing, and distant reconnaissance.
The result was to link the air weapon ever closer to the 
ground war.
The "Fokker scourge" left deep marks on the R. F. C. 
The losses in men and aircraft brought increased pressure- 
on the supply and training establishments at home. The grow­
ing casualty lists led to questions in the House of Commons 
and to criticism by the press. The British people wanted to 
know why a badly battered R. F. C. was being mauled by a 
seemingly superior enemy.^ An investigation was demanded, 
and early in 1916 a Committee of Inquiry, the Bailhache 
Committee, was appointed to look into the government's air 
policies. The Sea Lords at the Admiralty chose not to tes­
tify. As a result the investigation concentrated on the 
Royal Flying Corps, ignoring the Royal Naval Air Service 
which had followed a far different course through the first 
two years of the war.
When the war began in 1914, the Naval Wing of the 
original Royal Flying Corps had split away and had become 
the Royal Naval Air Service. The first wartime move of the
15. "Fifty Years of Military Aviation," p. 4.
16. John R. Cuneo, The Air Weapons, 1914-1916, Vol.
II of Winged Mars (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing
Co., 1947), p. 285.
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R. N. A. S. was to concentrate forces in the area of the Hum­
ber and the Thames and from Immingham to Clacton in anticipa­
tion of German airship attacks from Belgium. A coastal patrol 
was initiated on August 8 for the whole of the east coast.1  ^
The key to the early participation of the Royal NavaJ. 
Air Service in the war lies in the personality of Winston 
Churchill. Churchill, while, serving as First Lord at the 
Admiralty, assumed great control over the activities of the 
Naval Air Service and developed it along his own unorthodox
1 p
but ambitious lines.
Churchill foresaw the demands which would be made upon 
the R. F. C. in a European land war and anticipated that .the 
role of defending England from air attack would fall to the 
Navy by default. When Henderson took every available air­
craft and pilot to France in 1914, Churchill's Naval airmen 
immediately prepared to defend the home island. This step 
was formally recognized at a Cabinet meeting on September 3,
when Lord Kitchener asked Churchill and the Admiralty to
19assume responsibility for the air defense of Britain.
17. Raleigh and Jones, I, 360.
18. David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd 
George (6 vols; Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1933-37),
IV, 105.
19. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1918 
(4 vols; London: Odhams Press Limited, 1932), I, 265.
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The main German air threat to England came from the 
fleet of Zeppelins which had been developed before the war. 
Churchill was certain the Germans would attempt to operate 
these airships from bases near the Belgian coast and, from 
there, would attack England. The best defense against these 
attacks, he believed, was to deny the Belgian bases to Ger­
many and, this failing, to be prepared to attack the airships 
on the ground in Belgium. He ordered Royal Naval Air Ser­
vice aircraft to operate from Dunkirk and Calais to carry 
out this mission. To protect the Dunkirk air squadrons and 
any forward air fields which might be established, Churchill 
ordered the formation of patrols of armored motor cars.
These were to operate within 100 miles of Dunkirk. Since 
the motor car patrols were formed to protect the air squad­
rons, Captain Murray Sueter, the veteran Naval airman, w a s . 
placed in command. Soon the Royal Naval Air Service was oper­
ating eight squadrons of armored Rolls Royce automobiles 
across the French and Belgian countryside, fighting probably 
the last engagements of movement in a war which was quickly 
becoming stagnated in the trenches. By the end of October, 
the trenches of both armies extended to the sea. The armored 
cars could not maneuver in the battlefield, and the
30
immediate mission of the R. N. A. S. Armored Car Squadrons 
, 20came to an end.
The research and experiments which had characterized 
the activities of the R. N. A. S. before the war continued 
after hostilities began. In 1914, a torpedo-carrying sea­
plane was demonstrated for Churchill, and in 1915 three tor­
pedoes were fired from airplanes against enemy ships in the
21Dardanelles and three hits were scored* But full develop­
ment and procurement of this weapon was blocked by the Sea
22
Lords until much later in the war.
In 1915, with the fall of the Asquith Ministry, 
Churchill left the Admiralty. The development of the Air 
Department, under Captain Sueter, had been accomplished
20. Ibid., I, 267-73. The armored car battles of the 
R. N. A. S. squadrons are certainly one of the most fascin­
ating episodes of the entire war. More fascinating still
is the development from the armored cars of one of the major 
new weapons of the war, the tank. The early research on 
this vehicle was a direct result of the experience of the 
armored car crews in finding that they could be halted when 
the German cavalry dug trenches across the roads. Churchill 
determined that if they could not go around the enemy 
defenses, they must be able to go over them. Development of 
the tank was the result. He says, on p. 271, "The air was the 
first cause that took us to Dunkirk. The armoured car was the 
child of the air; and the Tank its grandchild."
21. Murray F. Sueter, Airmen or Noahs: Fair Play for 
Our Airmen (London, Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd., 1928), p. 56.
22. Ibid.
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largely with Churchill1s blessing and through his encourage­
ment. His methods were unorthodox, but successful. When 
Arthur Balfour succeeded Churchill, he immediately changed 
the organization of the air service, replacing the various
functions of supply and operations under the corresponding
23departments of the Admiralty. Design and procurement -of
aircraft was split among the several departments and placed
under the supervision of men who had little or no knowledge
24of aircraft or flight. As a result, many important
developments in air warfare were delayed. These included 
the air-launched torpedo, the aircraft carrier, reconnais­
sance, wireless communications, and the construction of the
25Handley Page bomber.
In the new atmosphere at the Admiralty, the naval air 
defense effort gradually withered away. The Sea Lords had 
never favored Churchill's air-mindedness. They saw the
entire air effort as "unrelated to the classic traditions
26of naval warfare."
23. Regulations for the reorganization of the Royal 
Naval Air Service were approved by the Board of the Admiralty 
in July, 1915. They stated in part: "The Royal Naval Air 
Service is to be regarded in all respects as an integral part 
of the Royal Navy, and in future the various air stations 
will be under the general orders of the Commander-in-chief or 
Senior Naval Officers in whose district they are situated." 
Cited in Raleigh and Jones, I, 485.
24. Ibid., II, 353-54. 25. Sueter, pp. 228-30.
26. Boyle, p. 122.
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As the war continued, the most significant early pro­
gram of the R. N. A, S.--a plan -to bomb Germany--was 
thwarted wheh the R. F. C., facing chronic shortages of 
equipment and battered by the Fokker scourge, was unable to 
meet its minimum commitment of squadrons for the battle of 
the Somme. Trenchard, in desperation, requested and received 
eighty of the Naval Service's Sopwith aircraft. This was the 
force which had been built for the raids against Germany.
The R. N. A. S.'s ambitious plans had to be cancelled. But,
for the Royal Flying Corps, the Naval Wing's policy of encour-
27
aging private aircraft manufacturers had saved the day.
Despite its timeliness, this temporary diversion of 
Naval aircraft to the use of the Royal Flying Corps was not 
the ultimate answer to the supply problems which continued to 
plague Trenchard. These shortages were rooted, at least in 
part, in the continuing competition between the War Office 
and the Admiralty for all available resources. Henderson and 
Brancker at the War Office were finding it more and more 
difficult to keep the Royal Aircraft Factory supplied with 
essential raw materials for aircraft production. The two 
services were competing also for aircraft engines which were
27. Raleigh and Jones, II, 452.
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available in the early stages of the war only from France.
There was no pooling of technical developments, inventions,
or experiments. Lloyd George, in his post-war memoirs,
charged that "the net result • . . was overlapping, ineffi-
28ciency, and a seriously swelling casualty list."
In an attempt to remedy the situation, the Government, 
in early 1916, created the Joint War Air Committee under the 
chairmanship of Lord Derby and with members from the War 
Office and the Admiralty. This organization was given the 
task of coordinating questions of design and supply for both 
air services and, by doing so, to draw the two closer toge­
ther. However, the Committee was given no executive author­
ity and, after a few months of ineffective wrangling, was 
disbanded. In resigning, Lord Derby said that the amalgama­
tion of the two services was the only ultimate solution to 
the problem. However, he added, the creation of a single air
service was probably too difficult a measure to attempt during 
29the war.
Public criticism of the administration of the air 
services continued. The Bailhache Committee began hearings
28. Lloyd George, IV, 106.
29. Raleigh and Jones, VI, 4.
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30in May. After taking evidence for several weeks, the group
issued a report in August which cleared the air leaders of
any dereliction, but was extremely critical of the military
supply system* The Board's report said:
We see no reason against having one Equipment Department 
charged with the equipment of both the Army and Navy 
flying services. There would no doubt be inter-service 
jealousy to contend with, but that should not be allowed 
to stop a much-needed reform.^
There were other critical reports. Lord Montagu, 
writing in a periodical, attacked the Royal Aircraft Factory, 
saying its output had been "negligible," and charging that it 
had a "discouraging influence on the development of aircraft.' 
He continued his criticism, claiming in a speech that the time 
had arrived when the air service should be capable of inde­
pendent action and that the two air services should be placed
3 3under one united control as "an Imperial Air Service".
Lord Milner, soon to become a member of the War Cabi­
net, confined his criticism to his notebooks, where he wrote
that "the chief difficulty seems to be that there is no
34unified direction or well thought-out air policy."
30. The Times (London), May 11, 1916, p. 5.
31. Cited in Boyle, p. 194.
32. Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, "Aviation Present and
Future," Edinburgh Review, CCXXIV, No. 475 (July 1916), 144.
33. The Times (London), May 10, 1916, p. 5.
34. John Evelyn Wrench, Alfred Lord Milner, 1854-
1925 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1958), p. 308.
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On May 11, Lord Derby's Joint War Air Committee was 
succeeded b y ‘the first Air Board with Lord Curzon as its 
president. This body was given somewhat broader powers to 
coordinate the production and supply efforts of the two air 
services, but still had no executive authority. The Board 
was directed to arrange for the free exchange of technical 
information and to eliminate competition between the two 
departments. However, all disputes which arose between the 
Admiralty and the War Office had to be referred to the War 
Committee.^
In July, the Somme offensive began, and Trenchard 
increased his pleas for equipment to carry on the air battle 
in France. In August, with the-Air Board making every 
effort to fill Trenchard's requests, Curzon discovered that 
the Admiralty planned to spend three million pounds sterling 
on an independent program of air expansion. His bitter pro­
tests to Balfour brought only the rejoinder that the
Admiralty had no intention of surrendering its planning
3 6authority to the Air Board.
As a result of this incident, the Air Board issued 
a report criticizing the Admiralty and condemning its lack
35. "Fifty Years of Military Aviation," pp. 4-5.
36. Boyle, p. 193.
of cooperation. The report, dated October 23, 1916, said
in part:
No expansion of ths work of the Air Board, no complete 
fulfillment of the charge with which it was entrusted, 
and no adequate provision for the urgent necessities of 
the future, are . . . possible, so long as the Admiralty 
adopts its present attitude towards the Air Board, and 
so long as the administration of the branch of the. air 
service which is in the hands of the Admiralty is con­
ducted on the present lines.
Publication of this report led to the exchange of a 
series of acrimonious letters between Curzon and Balfour. 
Finally, the War Committee, meeting on November 27 and 28, 
agreed to make major changes in the powers of the Air Board. 
These were in the draft stage when the Asquith Government 
fell, but they received formal approval by the new ministers 
of the Lloyd George coalition on December 22, 1916. The 
changes provided that the Ministry of Munitions should be 
responsible for design and supply of aircraft, and that the 
Air Board should allocate all available material resources 
between the Admiralty and the War Office. Along with the 
broadened authority, the Air Board got a new leader when Lord 
Cowdray succeeded Curzon as president. The New Ministries 
and Secretaries Act, 1916, which brought the second Air
37. "First Report of the Air Board," as cited in 
Lloyd George, IV, 108.
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Board into being, provided that: "For the purpose of this
Act the President of the Air Board shall be deemed to be a
Minister appointed under this Act, and the Air Board a Minis-
38try established under this Act #" The first faltering step 
toward the creation of a new air service had been taken.
38. Cited in "Fifty Years of Military Aviation," 
p. 5. See also Hilary St. George Saunders, Per Ardua (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1945), pp. 218-19.
CHAPTER III
AIR RAIDS AND REPERCUSSIONS
On January 7, 1915, Admiral von Pohl, Chief of the 
German Naval Staff, sent a memorandum to the Kaiser urging 
that■Germany's fleet of airships be used to attack and bomb 
England. London/ he maintained, was a defended area with 
large military establishments. Air raids on the city would 
be permissible under the Geneva Convention and would be 
militarily sound. Of course, he said, the German airship 
commanders would make every effort to avoid historical 
buildings or private property. After considering the pro­
posal for two days, the Kaiser approved the bombing of 
England, but specified that the attacks be confined to muni­
tions factories, arsenals, shipyards, and military estab­
lishments. London, he decreed, was not to be bombed. ■*"
On January 19, a pair of German Zeppelins crossed 
high over the east coast of England and dropped the first
" ' 1 ■ ■ 1  I l l " ' 1 ...... ■ 1 ' 1 —  ■ ■ 1 '■  !*  ■ -1 ' ■
1. John R* Cuneo, The Air Weapon, 1914-16, Vol. II 
of Winged Mars (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co.,
1947), p. 354.
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bombs on Yarmouth and King's Lynn, Norfolk. London was not
spared for long. On May 31, a German airship, armed this
time with William II's reluctant approval, passed over the
British capital at a great height and dropped its load of
2
bombs on the northeast sector of the city.
In this way began one of the most controversial 
aspects of the war in the air. For over a year, the giant 
Zeppelins crossed over the English countryside with virtual 
immunity, riding well above the'feeble efforts of the oppos­
ing British fighters to reach them. Actual military damage 
caused by the airships was negligible, but the people were 
aroused. The raids brought constantly increasing pressure 
on the government and on the military services.
As we have seen, immediately after the war began, 
Churchill accepted responsibility for the air defense of 
the island kingdom as part of the mission of the Royal Naval 
Air Service. His unorthodox, but direct, method of attack­
ing this problem was to seek out the German airships on the
2. Kenneth Poolman, Zeppelins Against London (New 
York: The John Day Co., 1961), pp. 35-36. This was the
LZ38, commanded by Hauptman Linnarz. The Times for June 1, 
1915, p. 8, noted only that a German airship had been "near" 
London and that a large number of fires had been set, and 
then printed the text of a government statement prohibiting 
any publication of news of the raid.
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ground in Belgium and to attempt to destroy them there-.
This tactic met with some early successes, but it made no 
provision for attacking the high-flying airships which did 
find their way over England. The problem was simple enough. 
The Zeppelins, awkward and hard to handle on the ground, when 
airborne operated at altitudes which the fighters could not. 
reach. Coupied with this deficiency in aircraft performance 
was a serious shortage of anti-aircraft artillery pieces and 
a shortage of the large search lights essential to spot the 
raiders during a night; a t t a c k , j t  made little difference 
which service had the responsibility for air defense of the 
home island. Until suitable equipment could be made avail­
able, little could be done.
From the first, the immunity with which the giant 
airships traversed England's skies brought harsh criticism 
of the Royal Flying Corps. As the criticism mounted in vol­
ume, Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, moved 
to head it off. He directed the R. F . C. to work out a 
method of attacking the German airships despite General
3. Lord Hankey, The Supreme Command, 1914-1918 
(2 vols; London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1961),
I, 239.
4 - Ibid., I, 240.
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Henderson's protests that air defense was the Navy's respon­
sibility. ^
With the heavy demands of the Expeditionary Force and 
the needs of the training school already taking every avail­
able machine, Colonei Sefton Brancker now had to locate air­
craft for the defense mission. By diverting men and machines 
from other tasks, an initial token effort was established 
with aircraft at Joyce Green and Brooklands. Later, a 
reserve squadron was established at South Farnborough.^
In mid 1915, when Balfour succeeded Churchill at the
Admiralty, one of his first acts was to request that the War
Office assume responsibility for air defense of the home
island. The War Office, no better equipped than the Navy to
carry out this mission, agreed to Balfour's proposal, but the
7
actual transfer was not concluded until early 1916.
The military value of these first Zeppelin raids was 
questionable. However, the effect on the morale of the
5. In a description of one of the earliest raids, 
General Headquarters, Home Forces, lists, under the title 
"Action of Airplanes," six sorties flown by R. N. A. S. air­
craft f and adds significantly: "Royal Flying Corps. No 
action." Cited in Poolman, p. 65.
6. Ibid., pp. 73-75.
7. Boyle, Trenchard's biographer, blames the delay 
for the transfer of responsibility on "the prevailing spirit 
of indecisiveness in Whitehall." See Andrew Boyle, Trenchard 
(London: Collins, 1962), p. 159.
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British people ahd, through them, the effect on the Govern­
ment, was significant, Londoners, particularly, were hard 
hit by the savage shock of the bombings. As the raids 
increased in tempo in the fall of 1915, the intensity of 
public feeling grew. Sir John Slessor, the first man to 
attack a Zeppelin in the air, and later a Marshal of the 
Royal Air Force, wrote that following a raid on October 13,
1915, conditions in Bast London were "not far removed from 
8
panic". The Times noted in an editorial, "to create panic 
has always been one of the chief objects of these /air/ 
invasions. They have now caused almost 700 casualties, 
chiefly amongst civilians,
The Government took defensive measures. Lighting 
restrictions were extended from London over all the eastern, 
central and northwestern areas of England. "Experience 
gained from the Zeppelin raid of January 31, /I916/ shows 
that this extension . . .  is necessary," The Times 
r e p o r t e d . B u t  as the lights went down, so did the spirits 
of the people. The nuisance value of the Zeppelin could not
- ' " I —    l. | —     I - . M l i ■■■»—  i ■■ n  I J i . i , . . . . . . . . . . .  ■■■ ' ' -  ■  —
8. The statement is on p. x of the Foreword which 
Slessor wrote for Poolman1s book.
9. The Times (London).,, February 2, 1916, p. 9. The 
casualty figure was high.
Ibid. February 9, 1916, p. 8.
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be ignored. Even an isolated raid over the midlands alarmed
11the public seriously.
However# despite its psychological value in England's 
skies, the Zeppelin was a poor military weapon. It was 
extremely subject to the whims of the weather, easily dam­
aged in turbulence# and was at the mercy of adverse wind 
conditions. By the fall of 1916# the pilots of the R. F. C., 
with improved equipment and new tactics, brought the huge 
airships within range of their guns. On September 23, 
Lieutenant W. Leefe Robinson, flying a B. E. 2C of one of 
the newly-formed Home Defense Squadrons, attacked the Schutte- 
Lanz S. L. 11 in a daring night battle and brought it down
in flames near Cuffley. For his feat, he was awarded the
12Victoria Cross.
Other victories by the R. F. C. followed, and these, 
coupled with numerous accidental losses by the Germans, led, 
in late 1916, to a decline in the Zeppelin raids. The 
German airmen, however# were not finished. The Zeppelins 
were replaced by the Gotha, a twin-engine bombing airplane -
11. Boyle, p. 160.
12. "Fifty Years of Military Aviation, 1912-1962," 
a Chronology published by the Air Ministry (London: 1962),
P- 5,
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superior to anything the allies had* The Gothas immediately 
began pight and, later, daylight attacks on London.
The raids by the Gothas, just as the airship raids, 
had little direct military value. However, the effect of 
flights of enemy bombers appearing over London in mid-day, - 
wending their way across the city and bombing indiscrimi­
nately as they went, brought the British people to the brink 
of panic. The value of the raids in slowing production of 
munitions--the vital element in the war of the trenches—  
while incalculable, was undoubtedly very significant.
On June 13, 1917, a flight of twenty-one Gothas
attacked England in a daring daylight raid. Fourteen of
the bombers made their way to London where they dropped 118
high-explosive bombs, one directly on the Liverpool Street
station. Nearly 150 people were killed and 350 injured.
Ninety British fighters rose to attack the bomber formation,,,
13but not a single Gotha was brought down.
This raid seriously aroused the people, but when the 
Gothas struck again on July 7, public opinion boiled over 
in threats against the Government and its leaders. The most 
popular British newspaper declared:
"■■T " w   ...........         — ....... i"T         i ,       "■   ■   . - '.i" 1— ■ ........
13. Raleigh and Jones, V, 26-28.
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Since the Dutch burned Chatham 250 years; ago «, . . 
there has not been a more discreditable event in our 
military history, . . » There is not a single redeem­
ing fact. The story is altogether humiliating,^^
Another journal complained that defense squadrons had been 
withdrawn from London to put on an exhibition for the King 
in France, and that still other aircraft had been taken from 
their defense duties to escort Princess Mary when she went 
to visit Southend,^5
Members of the Air Board watched the attack from the 
balconies of the Hotel Cecil where their offices were 
located. To them and to the other members of the Government# 
the press# and the public, the weakness of the nation's air 
defenses was only too apparent. When the War Cabinet met a 
few hours after the raid, it was in an atmosphere of glum 
recrimination.
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir William 
Robertson, wrote to General Douglas Haig, commanding the 
forces in France, that the Cabinet meeting was unbelievable.
"One would have thought that the world was coming to an end, " 
said the Field Marshal. "I could not get in a word edgeways."I?
14. Daily Mail, July 9, 1917, as cited in J. M.
Spaight, Air Power and War Rights (3d ed. rev.y London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1947), p. 7.
15. The Star, July 23, 1917, as cited in Spaight, p. 8.
16. Boyle, pp. 223-24.
17. Sir William Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, 
1914-1918 (2 vols? New Yorks Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926),
XI, 17.
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T^e Prime Minister, recalling his feelings on the day
of the raid, said?
There was no way of preventing these enemy planes from 
coming over. The most effective measure . . . was to 
furnish a powerful air fleet for home defence . . . and
to carry out reprisal raids on enemy cities on a scale 
which would convince them that this form of warfare was 
a bad business. For both of these purposes, large num- 
bers of planes were needed. °
During the course of the war, the German raiders
attacked England on 103 separate missions and dropped 8,579
bombs weighing over 270 tons. The attacks resulted in the
deaths qf 1,4Q4 persons and injuries to 3,416 others. Mone-
1 Qtary damage reached almost three million pounds sterling. J
Twenty-five oi these raids were directed against the London
metropolitan area, and these resulted in 67 0 deaths and
1,960 injuries- Over two-thirds of the monetary damage was
20done in the London area.
Assessment of the actual value of the raids has 
ranged from that of Kapitanleutnant H. Hollender, a German 
airship commander, who claimed that 500,000 men and enormous
18. David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd 
George (6 vols.? Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1933-37),
IV, 115.
19. With neat British precision, the official histor­
ian has worked this out to 0.56 casualties per bomb dropped, 
and a monetary damage of 345 pounds sterling per bomb 
dropped. The figures are in Raleigh and Jones, Appendices, 
p. 164.
20. Ibid.
i "  i - i i
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21numbers of guns and aircraft were kept immobilized, to
those of the patriotic writers who maintained that the raids
22actually strengthened British morale. Certainly the truth
fell somewhere between. The raids caused a serious drop in
production of war materials/ not only in the vicinity of
London, but, according to the official historian, "also in
23the midlands end in the north." Sykes thought that the
psychological effect was far greater than the actual casual­
ties but that any air raid warning caused a "serious diminu­
tion of output" of war materials- This extended, he said,
beyond the locality raided and lasted well after the raid 
24
had ended, Field Marshal Robertson noted the tendency
for London residents of the East End to panic during the 
raids and the scurrying search for refuge which, in late
21. The German Air Force in the Great War, comp. 
George Paul Neumann (London: Hopper and Stoughton, Ltd., 
n.d.), p. 123.
22. Cuneo, p. 361, says: "It is loosely stated in
many sources that the raids actually raised the British 
morale. This is sheer nonsense." However, the young Sholto 
Douglas, recuperating at home after an aircraft accident in 
France, recalled that, "although the people at home were 
disturbed over the casualties, and rightly horrified that 
the Germans should have Staged these raids, I did not find 
that the home front was in any way shaken." Sholto Douglas, 
Years of Combat (Londop: Collins, 1963), p. 211.
23. Raleigh and Jones, III, 245-47.
24. Frederick Sykes, From Many Angles (London:
George G- Farrap & Company, Ltd., 1942), p. 222.
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19X7, found as msny 300,000 people sleeping in the tubes 
even when there were no alarms. At Woolwich arsenal, follow­
ing the raids in late 1917, output of .303 cartridges dropped
25to nineteen per cent of normal. The overall effect on
British munitions production was placed as high as a one-
sixth reductipn. Equally important, aircraft which were
needed in France were retained at home to counter the attacks.
On some ogcasfons, squadrons were even ordered to return
27
from France for home defense.
Sir George Cave, the Home Secretary, probably best 
described the value of the raids when he said on June 14,
1917, that ", . * it would be worth the enemy's while to
have these raids every day. .. . . If you give warning to
all munition factories, you put a stop to the manufacture of
munitions-" And this, he said, "will have its effect on the 
fighting forces and the lives of our soldiers and sailors."28
The pressure on the Government was becoming intense 
even before the daylight raid of July 7, 1917. On June 17,
25. Robertson, II, 16. See also Cuneo, p. 361, and 
Cyril Falls, The First World War (London: Longmans Green
and Co., Ltd., I960), pp. 347-48.
26. Brigadier General Percy R. C. Groves, Behind the 
Smoke Screen (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1934), pp.
117-18.
27. Robertson, II, 16.
28. Cited in The Aeroplane, January 2, 1918, p. 21.
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a mass meeting was held at the London Opera House under the
sponsorship of The Daily Express. The Lord Mayor acted as
the chairman/ and two members of Parliament who had consis­
tently attached the Government's air policies, Noel 
Pemberton-Dilling and Basil Peto, were among the speakers.
The Aeroplane noted that '’the meeting unanimously and emphat
29ically demanded a policy of reprisals against Germany."
On July 9, a secret session of the House of Commons was
held to discuss the air raids, and on July 13, all the
London M. P.s went as a deputation to Lloyd George to demand
30
that something be done to protect the city.
The two favorite themes of the public protests were
demands for huge air fleets to protect the home island 
and equally vociferous demands for fleets of British bombers 
to attack Germany. With the Royal Flying Corps's major 
forces committed to the trench-bound battle in France, 
and with the continued inadequate exploitation of the air 
weapon by the Admiralty, to follow both these courses was 
obviously impossible. To follow either of them adequately 
appealed to be very nearly impossible.
29. Ibid,
30. Ibid., January 9, 1918, p. 143.
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Many Englishmen believed a single air service was 
an essential first St©P to find a way out of the dilemma. 
Those who had long fought for such a goal suddenly found 
their cause gaining many new advocates,
CHAPTER XV
ONE ELEMENT— ONE SERVICE
The Roy^l Flying Corps was created in 1912 as a 
separate and unified force. However, by 1914, the intran­
sigence pf the Admiralty split the new force in two, and 
Britain entered the war with a weah and ill-equipped ser­
vice. Now, after three years of bloody, land-locked 
warfare, thoughtful men were demanding that the nation's 
air weapon again be welded into one.
Lord Haldane's sub-committee of the Committee of 
imperial .Defence recommended in 1911 that, "The British 
Aeronautical Service should be regarded as one, and should , 
be designated 'The Flying Corps'."1 This recommendation, 
approved by the Asquith Cabinet, was the basis of the Royal 
Warrant which created the Royal Flying Corps. The R. F. C. 
was, according to the Committee of Imperial Defence, to 
include a Military Wing, a Naval Wing, a Central Flying
1. Walter Raleigh and H- A. Jones, War in the Air 
(6 vols. and appendices; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1922-
1937), I, 206.
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School, a Reserve, and the Royal Aircraft Factory. While
the young airmen accepted and hailed this decision as the
beginning of a new service, the older military leaders,
notably those at the Admiralty, were determined that it
2
should not be.
The main difficulty for the airmen lay in the basic 
organization of the R. F. C. The original Joint Air Com­
mittee was formed to coordinate the air policies of the 
Admiralty and the War Department. But it had no decision­
making authority and had ceased to function long before the 
war. Under these conditions/ it was not difficult for the 
Admiralty to turn the Naval Wing into the Royal Naval Air 
Service and make it independent of the rest of the Royal 
Flying Corps.
Despite the Admiralty's coup, the question of an 
independent air service was constantly debated from 1911 
until the Royal Air Force was finally formed in 1918. Major
2. F. M. Sykes, the first Commander of the Military 
Wing, writing of the earliest days of the R. F. C. in 1912,- 
says: "1 was convinced that the correct policy . . . was
to regard the Air Service as a separate arm, distinct from 
the other two services, and that it would become of equal 
status with them. This idea was violently opposed by 
senior naval and military officers." Frederick Sykes, From 
Many Angles (London: George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., 1942),
p. 98.
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Frederick Sykes, first Commander of the Military Wing of the 
R. F. C., was questioned on the subject when he presented a 
paper on military aviation to the Aeronautical Society on 
February 4, 1914, A member of the House of Commons asked 
Sykes if the flying corps was to remain part of the Army and 
Navy or to become a separate service. Neither Sykes nor 
General David Henderson, who was also present, provided an 
answer for the M. P., but the question indicated the level
3
of continuing interest in the problem.
More serious agitation for a single air service began 
in 1915, when the crushing advent in France of the Fokker 
era and the Zeppelin raids on London combined to shatter 
public confidence in the Government1s air policies. As the 
casualty lists from France grew longer, the nation's leaders 
sought reasons for the apparent inferiority of the R. F. C. 
They found them in the inherent weaknesses in the administra­
tion of the air services and in the constant competition for 
material and manpower between the Admiralty and the War 
Office.4
3. The Aeroplane, February 12, 1914, p. 164.
4. John R. Cuneo, The Air Weapons, 1914-16, Vol. II 
of Winged Mars (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing
Co., 1947), p. 285.
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On July 20, 1915, William Joynson-Hicks, the same mem­
ber of Commons who had que-stioned Sykes in February, 1914, 
rose in, the House to suggest the appointment of "some man 
of imagination and power" to advise the Government on creat-
5
ing an efficient air service. He was followed in the 
debate by other members who urged a "separate department for
0
aeroplanes and particularly a Ministry of Aeroplanes."
The Globe newspaper began an editorial campaign urging
a separate service. Charles Palmer, the editor, wrote on
October 13, 1915:
We kept our land inviolate so long as the sea was the 
method of approach to our shores. The menace now is 
from the air. It is a menace that grows more actual 
every day. . . . Those who know and understand the
danger will be supported in the demand for a Royal Air 
Service as a separate fighting force, with all that 
makes such a force complete and efficient. . . .  If 
the Government will not move . . . the nation must make7
them move.
The Times joined in to note editorially that "the 
presence of a squadron of enemy aircraft over English soil 
emphasizes the advent of a new element in warfare. . . .
5. Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons),
LXXIII (1915), 1357,
6. Ibid., 1377.
7. Cited in Murray Sue ter, Airmen or Noahs t Fair 
Play for Our Airmen (London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., 
1928), p. 225.
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The mastery of the air may at no distant time be not less
g
vital . . . than the mastery of the sea."
In the House of Lords, the fight was led by Lord 
Montagu who, late in the fall of 1915 during a debate on 
the air service, coined the phrase, "one element, one ser­
vice." This slogan became a rallying cry for the supporters
g
of a single air service in the press and in Parliament.
Lord Montagu told a meeting on May 10, 1916, that the time
had arrived when the air service should act independently.
He urged combining the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal
Flying Corps into one fighting force called the "Imperial
Air Service. The Times forecast editorially that "a
rearrangement of the Air Service on a considerable scale is
in prospect- - - - Neither House is satisfied with the Air
11
record of the Government- Lord Montagu, returning to
the attack on May 23, launched a lengthy debate in the House
of Lords when he urged the members to declare:
That this House considers that the development of avia­
tion for purposes of war can no longer be efficiently 
carried on under the present system of the divided con­
trol and responsibility of two separate Departments;
8. The Times (London), February 3, 1916, p, 9.
9. Sueter, p. 228.
10. The Times (London), May 10, 1916, p. 5.
11- Ibid., May 13, 1916, p. 7.
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and that the time has now arrived when the supply of 
men and materials should be concentrated under single 
control.^
The most flamboyant and colorful politician leading the 
fight for revision of the Government's air policies was Noel 
Pemberton-Billing. He was one of the earliest British air 
pioneers. In 1911, he organized the Supermarine Aviation 
Works, and when the war began, he was commissioned in the 
Royal Naval Air Service. He organized and planned the air 
raid by R. N. A. S. forces on the Zeppelin plant at Fried- 
richshafen November 21, 1914. This raid, brilliantly con­
ceived and executed, gave Pemberton-Billing a considerable 
reputation as an air authority. However, he rapidly became 
disillusioned with the manner in which the air weapon was 
being used. He resigned from the R. N. A. S. in January,
1916, and, returning home, was elected to Parliament in 
13March, 1916.
No sooner had Pemberton-Billing assumed his seat in 
the House of Commons than he launched a virulent attack on 
the R. F. C. He charged that the air leaders were guilty of 
criminal negligence and that the aircraft procured by the
12. Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 
XXII (1916), 101.
13. Cuneo, pp. 443-44n.
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R. F. C. were "Fokker fodder". He said that "quite a num­
ber of our gallant officers in the Royal Flying Corps have 
been rather murdered than killed".^ His attack caused a 
considerable stir and forced the Government to promise an 
independent investigation into the administration and command 
of the Royal Flying Corps. The result was the Bailhache 
inquiry.
The Bailhache Committee began taking testimony in
15 _  .May. By August 3, the Committee issued an interim
report vindicating the leaders of the Royal Flying Corps and
the Royal Aircraft Factory, and even expressing admiration
for the effort made under the stress of w a r . ^  The final
report, issued in December, recommended the creation of an
Air Board to supervise the design and construction of air-
i  7
craft for both services.
14. Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 
LXXXI (1916), 246.
15. Andrew Boyle, Trenchard (London: Collins, 1962), 
p. 175. According to Boyle, Trenchard's biographer, Trenchard 
was greatly concerned about the effects of the Bailhache 
hearings on the morale of his pilots and blamed Henderson
for urging the Government to conduct them.
16. The report was called a white wash. See C. G. 
Grey, A History of the Air Ministry (London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1940), pp. 54-60.
17. Raleigh and Jones, I, 162.
58
Appointment of the Bailhache Committee did not stem 
the criticism. Lord Montagu, in an article published after 
the appointment of the Bailhache group, but before the issu­
ance of the interim report in August, wrote:
The criticisms of the flying services . . . which began
in 1914 and were at their height in the spring of this 
year / T 9 1 6 h a v e  . . . on the whole produced good
results. But . . . questions of greater importance
have been left out of sight. The main question is 
whether our present programme of military aviation is 
adequate. . . . Till recently the programme was dis-.
tinctly inadequate. We have not enough airplanes at 
the front today to do the work.
In addition to launching the Bailhache inquiry, the 
Government responded to the increasing criticism by appoint­
ing a new Joint War Air Committee with Lord Derby as presi­
dent. This group was charged with coordinating the problems 
of supply and design of aircraft for both the R. F. C. and 
the R. N. A. S., but it had no executive authority. Like 
the defunct Joint Air Committee, the new body could only 
make recommendations to the Admiralty and the War Office. 
After only eight meetings, both Derby and Lord Montagu, the 
two independent members who did not belong to either of the
contending agencies, resigned. It was apparent that volun-
19tary agreements could not be reached. The first wartime
18. Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, "Aviation Present and 
Future, " Edinburgh Review, CCXXIV, No. 457 (July, 1916), 142.
19. Maurice Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-1918 (2 
vols.; London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1961), II, 549.
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attempt at joint air coordination had come forth stillborn, 
strangled by interdepartmental wrangling over parochial 
views.
To fill this void, Lord Curzon, a Cabinet member, and 
Maurice Hanfcey, the Secretary of the War Committee, drew up 
a plan for an Air Board to be headed by a Cabinet Minister 
and with greater authority than the Joint War Air Committee. 
The president was authorized to refer disputes between the 
Admiralty and the War Office to the War Committee for deci­
sion- The Board was given the broadest possible charter to 
discuss all policy matters related to the air war and parti­
cularly to matters of combined operations of the Naval and 
Military services- It was also to mahe recommendations on 
air equipment for both services and to coordinate the free
and complete interchange of research and inventions. Curzon
20was chosen as the Board's president- In revealing the plan
for the Air Board, both Curzon and Bonar Law indicated it was
21the first step toward an Air Ministry-
2-0* Ibid- Trenchard, when he heard of the plan for 
the Air Board, thought its powers pretentious and its author­
ity vague. He wrote to Henderson that "I suppose that moun­
tain of conceit G. N. C. /Curzon/" will be put in as head of 
it. 1 Cited in Boyle, p- 176.
21. Hankey, II, 549. See also Great Britain, 5 
Parliamentary Debates (Commons), LXXXII (1916), 1599-1618.
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The new Board, spurred on by Curzon, was extremely
active and held several meetings each week. However, this
new drive soon foundered on the same shoal which had sunk
its two predecessors-^Admiralty opposition• After some
twenty-five meetings, Curzon wrote the report to the War
Committee in which he attacked Balfour's obstructionist atti- 
22tude* The report resulted in a lengthy exchange of sharp
and bitter memoranda between the two men* The War Committee 
was in the midst of this battle and was considering a scheme
to expand the powers of the Air Board when the Asquith
23Government fell*
One of the first decisions of Lloyd George's new War 
Cabinet in December, 19X7, was to clarify and broaden the 
powers of the Air Board* Curzon, appointed to the War Cabi­
net, was succeeded at the Air Board by Lord Cowdray, a news­
paper publisher* The Board became a Ministry and the presi-
24dent a Minister of the Government* A month and a half
later, on February 2, 1917, the War Cabinet further stream­
lined the process of aircraft procurement* The Air Board 
was made responsible for experimental work, approval of
22* See above, Chapter IX*
23* Hankey, II, 550-51*
24* "Fifty Years of Military Aviation, 1912-1962," 
a Chronology published by the Air Ministry (London: 1962),
p* 5*
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aircraft design, and for the number of each model to be 
ordered, and the appropriate allocation between the R. F. C. 
and the R , N„ A. S. At the same time, the Ministry of Muni­
tions was given full responsibility for production, inspec­
tion, and delivery of aircraft. After years of confusion and
conflict, the first positive action had been taken to solve
25the problems of aircraft supply.
However, by July, continuing Parliamentary and press 
attacks on the Government's air policies touched a sensitive 
nerve within the Lloyd George Cabinet. As protests over the 
daylight bombing raids on London approached a crescendo, the 
War Cabinet responded on July 11 by naming a special 
committee to consider both the problem of air defense and 
the broader and more significant problem of air organization 
in general. The select committee was to be headed by the 
Prime Minister himself, so important was the problem. To
25. C. G. Grey, the vitriolic editor of The Aeroplane 
challenges the otherwise generally undisputed fact of in­
creased production under the joint direction of the second 
Air Board and the Ministry of Munitions. He says that in 
the Air Board's offices at the Hotel Cecil each bedroom was 
occupied by a bureaucrat concerned only with getting his own 
requisitions filled. The result, claims Grey, was utter 
confusion. So great did the confusion become that the Hotel 
Cecil came to be called Bolo House after a German spy, Bolo 
Pasha, "because everybody there was either actively interfer­
ing with the progress of the War, or was doing nothing to 
help its progress." Grey, p. 65.
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serve with him, and to actually conduct the investigation, 
Lloyd George selected the South African leader, Lieutenant 
General Jan, Christian Smuts. Smuts was told to examine all
<r\ /"
aspects of the use of the air weapon. It was a fateful
charge. From his investigation, eventually, came the Royal 
Air Force.
26. David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd 
George (6 vols.; BQSton: Little Brown and Company, 1933-37),
IV, 118.
CHAPTER V
SMUTS: RIGHT MAN, RIGHT TIME
Jan Christian Smuts held a unique position in the 
British Government. He fought the English in the Boer War, 
but in 1916 defended the British Empire, directing the cam­
paign against Lettow-Vorbeck's forces in German East Africa. 
In 1917, as the South African Minister of Defense, he came 
to London to attend a meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet.
Lloyd George immediately recognized Smuts's outstand­
ing abilities and prevailed upon him to remain in London as 
a member of the War Cabinet.'*" Smuts 1 s decision not to seek 
election to Parliament to "legalize" his appointment kept
him free from the entanglements of internal British 
2politics.
1. Lloyd George says that this "called forth some 
indignant protests from members of my ministry, who were 
horrified at the unprecedented step I was taking." See 
David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (6 
vols,; Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1933-37), IV, 93.
2. William Keith Hancock, Smuts: The Sanguine
Years,_ 1870-1919 (Cambridge: University Press, 1962), p.
436.
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When pressure for an investigation of the Government's
air policies reached a peak in July, 1917, Lloyd George
sought a man with a "fresh and able mind, free from depart-
3
mental prejudices" for the task* His seeking eye fell on 
Smuts. Free from parochial views and untainted by political 
controversies, Smuts brought to the task a reputation for 
honesty and integrity and a strong desire to see the war won 
as quickly as possible.
Smuts well knew the political controversy which had 
grown up over the air services during the war and at first 
was reluctant to head the investigation. It was only when 
the Prime Minister agreed to assume the political responsi­
bility by calling hir^self the chairman of the committee that
4
Smuts agreed tp undertake the task.
The War Cabinet directed Smuts to consult with "rep­
resentatives pf the Admiralty, the General Staff and Field- 
Marshal Commanding-in-Chief Home Forces," and with "such 
other experts as /he/ may desire." Two problems were to be 
examined: "(1) The defence arrangements for Home Defence
3. Lloyd George, IV, 118.
4. Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones, War in the Air
(6 volso and appendices; oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922^37),
VI, 11.
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against air raids," and "(2) The air organization generally 
and the direction of aerial operations,"
Smuts, with characteristic drive, began immediate 
hearings. By July 19, he reported to the War Cabinet that 
the German air raids had succeeded because England's air 
defense was poorly organized, London, his report said, was 
the nerve center of the Empire and might find itself within 
six months on the front"line of battle. To counter the Ger­
man air threat, drastic measures were required. These 
Included the assignment of all responsibility for air defense 
to a single commander, the reorganization of anti-aircraft 
weapons into concentric circles around London, and the 
development of new air tactics, including fighters operating 
in formation,^ The War Cabinet quickly put these recommen­
dations into effect.
The second task, the overall examination of air 
policy, was a much larger problem. Smuts, after consulting
5, Ibid,, Appendices, 8,
6, Raleigh and Jones, V, 41-44, By August 5/ the 
London Air Defence Area had been created under the command 
of Major General E. B. Ashmore, and three new R. F. C. squad­
rons equipped with Camels and Pups had been ifbrffied specifi­
cally to operate against the Gothas in the daylight raids.
See "Fifty Years of Military Aviation, 1912-1962," a Chron­
ology published by the Air Ministry (London: 1962), p, 5.
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Lloyd George, decided three questions must be answered by 
the investigation. These were:
1. Shall there be instituted a real Air Ministry 
responsible for all air organization and operations?
2. Shall there be constituted a unified Air Ser­
vice embracing both the present Royal Naval Air Service 
and Royal Flying Corps?
3. If so, how shall the relations of the new Air 
Service to the Navy and Army be determined so that the 
functions at present discharged for them by the
R. N. A. S. and R. F. C. respectively shall continue 
to be efficiently performed by the new Air Service?^
The hearings which Smuts held revealed the depth and 
intensity of the dispute over national air policy. The 
views expressed in secret session covered a wide range.
Some witnesses thought the controversy was unrelated to 
the successful completion of a bitter, land-locked war which 
was draining the resources of the combatant nations. Others 
saw a single air service as the only solution to the stale­
mate of the trenches. Among the latter, Smuts found many 
who wanted to plan for a single air service, but feared 
reorganizing during the war would be an impossible task. 
Others favored expansion of the powers of the Air Board, even 
to the point of forming a third air service under Air Board
7. Lloyd George, IV, 120.
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control. A few favored the ultimate step of unification of
the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps into
\
one separate force, the equal of the Army and the Navy.
Smuts initially leaned toward the view that complete 
reorganization of the British air service should be delayed
Q
until after the war. Two important documents changed this 
opinipn. The first of these was a memorandum from Lord 
Cowdray, dated July 28, 1917. In it Cowdray, the President 
of the Air Board, set out his ideas on air organization. He 
proposed that the present Air Board be given a "war staff of 
recognized experts." This staff, Cowdray said, should plan 
for the single service which would be formed when the war 
was finished. However, "it appears to me beyond question," 
he wrote, "that during the war the administration of the 
Naval and Military Air Services as they at present exist . .
Q
should not be changed. More important, however, was
Cowdray's discussion of what he called the "Surplus Aircraft 
Fleet." Early in the summer of 1917, following reorganiza­
tion of the first Air Board, Cowdray and Sir William Weir, 
in charge of aircraft procurement for the Ministry of
8. Hancock, p. 441.
9. Raleigh and Jones, VI, 8-9.
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Mlmitions, had forecast a big increase in production of air­
craft. This increase, they claimed, would create a surplus 
beyond the needs of the Army and the Navy. Cowdray now pro­
posed to Smuts that this surplus be used to form a bombing 
force controlled by the warstaff of the Air Board. "It 
should," he said, "be possible for the Surplus Aircraft Fleet 
to be placed directly under the Air Board without any serious 
dislocation of existing arrangements."10 Smuts quickly 
detected the flaw in Cowdray's somewhat contradictory plan. 
Under it, there would be added to the War Office and Admir­
alty air policies, Air Board air policies. This would be 
no solution but an added complication.
The second important document submitted to Smuts was 
the memorandum by Lieutenant General David Henderson, dated
10. Ibid., VI, 9. The figures on the Surplus Air­
craft Fleet were a projection by Cowdray and by Sir William . 
Weir, Controller of Aeronautical Supplies in the Ministry 
of Munitions. Lloyd George indicates in his memoirs that 
he accepted the figures and believed that "we should soon 
possess an air fleet much in excess of the necessary demands 
of the Army and Navy." See Lloyd George, IV, 117. C. G. 
Grey, writing in The Aeroplane on January 9, 1918, says that
the efforts of Cowdray and Weir to increase aircraft produc­
tion got the "R. F. C. in the field . . . thoroughly well
equipped" by the end of 1917. Boyle maintains that Smuts 
was misled by the personnel in the Supplies and Contracts 
Branch of the Air Board and that if he had not believed that 
the Surplus Aircraft Fleet would eventually be produced, he 
would never have signed the Smuts Report. See Boyle, pp.
23 3, 243. The projected figures, had they been met, would
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July 19, 1917. After surveying the entire air problem, 
Henderson criticised the way in which authority for air 
planning was divided among the various branches of the 
Government. He cited a recently approved increase in the 
sisc of the R» F. C, as an example„ For this War Cabinet- 
approved action to actually come about, he said, the Air 
Board and the Ministry of Munitions would have to supply 
the machines, the Army Council the personnel, and the. 
Department of Fortifications and Works the additional air 
fields. Should any of these agencies fail, the increase in 
strength would not be achieved, and this failure would.be 
for reasons well outside the authority of the Air Board.^
have provided for an Air Force of 200 Service Squadrons.
They were not met primarily because of disastrous failures 
in engine production. In January, 1918, there were 400 new
S. E. 5 airplanes in storage because no engines were avail­
able for them. See Raleigh and Jones, VI, all of Chapter II. 
Despite this, in discussing the Surplus Aircraft Fleet fig­
ures and particularly in weighing Smuts 1s belief in them, it 
is necessary to evaluate the actual war-end position of the 
Royal Air Force. In November, 1918, the R. A. F. had. over 
22,000 airplanes, and the nation's aircraft industry was pro­
ducing about 110 airplanes each day--aimost twice the entire 
force Henderson ha,d been able to muster to cross the channel 
in 1915. See J. M. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights (3d ed. 
rev.; London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1947), p. 5. See also
"Fifty Years of Military Aviation,' 1912-1962, " p. 8.
11. Lieutenant General Sir David Henderson, "Memoran­
dum on the Organization of the Air Services," cited in 
Raleigh and Jones, Appendices, 1-8.
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The only method of overcoming the "present illogical situa­
tion of divided responsibility in aeronautics/" said 
Henderson, was the formation of a "complete department and 
a complete united service dealing with all operations in 
the air, and with all the accessory services which that 
expression implies," A temporary loss of efficiency would 
occur, but if the Government believed the war would last 
until June, 1918, the change should be made, Henderson con- 
eluded.12
Smuts had seen for himself the effect of the German 
air raids on tbe morale of the people of London, During the 
course of the hearings, he slowly came to the conclusion 
that the new fighter squadrons and the anti-aircraft artil­
lery were not a sufficient defense for the city. An offen­
sive air weapon was essential to carry the war to the heart 
of Germany. "We can only defend this island effectively 
against air attacks by offensive measures, by attacking the 
enemy in his air bases on the Continent and in that way
destroying his power of attacking us across the Channel,"
13he believed.
12. Ibid.
13, J. C. Smuts, Jan Christian Smuts; a Biography 
(New York: Morrow, 1952), p. 193. See also Hancock, p. 441.
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Smuts was reinforced in the conclusion that was grow­
ing in his mind by letters such as the one he received from 
Lord Milner during the hearings# Milner, a member of the 
War Cabinet, wrote:
Say what you like, the soldiers and sailors at the War 
Office and Admiralty do not yet grasp the fact that 
there is a new kind of warfare before us and that, 
besides the help they have to give the army and navy, 
the airmen will have to fight battles of their own.
On August 17, 1917, barely six weeks after hearings
had begun, the document known as the Smuts Report was 
15issued. In the 6,000-word report, Smuts called for the
establishment of a separate air service with status equal to 
that of the older services and with an independent ministry 
in control. The report criticized the way in which the 
existing Air Board was constituted* saying it was not 
really effective because it functioned merely as a confer­
ence. Its main function was to fulfill the requirements of 
war policy established by the Army and the Navy. Subordina­
tion of the air service could no longer be justified, the 
report said, because air power could be used as an
14. Smuts, p. 192.
15. Formally, the "Second Report of the Prime 
Minister's Committee on Air Organization and Home Defence 
Against Air Raids, dated 17th August 1917." The complete 
report is sometimes difficult to locate. Because of this, 
the entire document* as it appears in Raleigh and Jones, 
Appendices, 8-14, is included as Appendix I.
72
independent means of carrying on a war. In fact, said Smuts,
the day was approaching when air operations, capable of
destroying enemy industry and population on a vast scale,
might well be the principle operations of war. When this
happened, the older forms of military and naval operations
16would become "secondary and subordinate."
With the "Surplus Aircraft Fleet" in mind, Smuts
pointed out that while aircraft production throughout the
war had been insufficient for the needs of the Army and Navy,
that day appeared to be passing. Now, he wrote,
the program of aircraft production which the War Cabi­
net has sanctioned for the following twelve months is 
far in excels of Navy and Army requirements. Next 
spring and summer the position will be that the Army 
and Navy will have all the Air Service required . . .
and over and above that there will be a great surplus
available. , . . Who is to look after and direct the
activities of this available surplus? Neither the Army 
nor the Navy is specially competent to do so; and for 
that reason the creation of an Air Staff for planning 
and directing independent air operations will soon be 
pressing, ^
Looking to the future employment of this new air arm, 
he said, "It requires some imagination to realize that next 
summer, while our Western Front may still be moving forward
16. Raleigh and Jones, Appendices, 10.
17. Ibid.
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at a snail'a pace in Belgium and France, the air battle-front 
will be far behind on the Rhine.
The new force should be created. Smuts continued, by 
combining the existing air services. If the Army and Navy 
should maintain their own special air services in addition 
to the force under the Air Ministry, it would "make the con­
fusion hopeless and render the solution of the air problem 
19impossible." Smuts concluded by recommending that no
publicity be given the proposed change in order to deny intel-
20ligence of its nature to the enemy.
The report was sweeping and inclusive, and its recom­
mendations were revolutionary. It met with divided opinion - 
from both political and military leaders. The War Cabinet 
considered the report on August 24 and give it tentative 
approval. A new body, known as the Air Organization Com­
mittee, was appointed. This Committee, under Smuts's 
direction, was told to investigate the details of amalgamat­
ing the existing air services and to draft the necessary 
legislation.
I8 • Ibid., p . 11,
19. Ibid., p. 12.
20. Ibid., p. 14.
21. Raleigh and Jones, VI, 13.
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Appointment of the Air Organization Committee did not 
mean that the War Cabinet fully supported Smuts's recommenda­
tions. The Admiralty, represented by the newly-appointed 
First Sea Lord, Sir Eric Geddes, was dogmatically opposed 
to any interference with tbe Royal Naval Air Service.
Geddes suggested that the new Air Ministry assume control of
the Royal Flying Corps and leave the Royal Naval Air Service 
22alone. Balfour, serving as Secretary of State for For­
eign Affairs, but true to his colors as a former First Sea 
Lord, supported Geddes. Derby, the Secretary of State for 
War, shifted back and forth from support to opposition.
Bonar Lew avoided the controversy, while Milner and Cowdray 
both feared the dislocation to the war effort which would 
occur if a separate force was formed. Only Curzon and
Churchill, the latter back in the Government as the Minister.
23of Munitions, fully supported Smuts's proposals.
The military leaders were also divided. The Naval
airmen, anxious to be free of the restrictive atmosphere of
24
the Admiralty, supported the plan. The leaders of the
22. Lloyd George, XV, 122-23.
23. Andrew Boyle, Trenchard (London: Collins, 1962),
pp. 230-31.
24. The Aeroplane, January 9, 1918, p. 172e.
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R. F. C, f with the notable exception of Henderson, were
25
almost all opposed to the single service.
Trenchard, commanding the R. F. C. in France, had 
suffered for two years from chronic shortages of aircraft. 
He attached the idea of the "Surplus Aircraft Fleet" and 
blames Henderson for letting Smuts believe such an increase 
in production was possible. "I thought," he wrote later, 
"that if anything were done . . .  to weaken the Western 
Front# the war would be lost# and there would be no air
O
service# united or divided. Haig# commanding the Expe­
ditionary Force in France# told the Cabinet that "after 
more than three years of war# our armies are still very far 
short of their requirements# and my experience of repeated 
failure to fulfill promises . . . makes me somewhat skepti­
cal as to the large surplus of machines on which the
27committee counts."
25. Ibid. See also Boyle# pp. 231-32.
26. Trenchard later admitted that "Henderson had 
twice the insight and understanding that I had. He was 
prepared to run risks rather than lose a chance which he 
saw might never come again. . . .  It is doubtful whether 
the R. A. F. or Britain realises its debt to him# which is 
at least as great as its debt to Smuts." See Boyle# pp. 
232-33.
27. Raleigh and Jones# VI# 15. See also The Private 
Papers of Douglas Haig# 1914-19, ed. Robert Blake (London: 
Eyre & Spottiswood# 1952)# p. 252.
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Despite the controversy, the Air Organization Com­
mittee continued planning the amalgamation of the two exist­
ing air services. David Henderson, appointed by Smuts, 
was the moving spirit behind the body. A number of sub^ -
committees under his guidance sought solutions to the myriad
28problems of merging the two forces.
The controversy caused the War Cabinet to withhold 
final approval of Smuts's recommendations throughout the 
month of September despite new raids by the Gotha bombers.
No public announcement had been made of the Smuts proposals 
and, as a result, criticism of the Government air policies 
continued to increase. When the War Cabinet met on Octo­
ber 8, Smuts urged hloyd George to make a public statement 
on the new air proposals- The Prime Minister, always 
sensitive to controversy, declined, saying that the time
might not be right for the formation of a separate air 
29
service.
With the issue at an impasse, new and important 
pressure was applied to the War Cabinet. On October 10,
28. Raleigh and Jones, VI, 13. The other members 
were Cowdray, Major J. D. Baird, M. P., Commodore G. M. 
Paine, and Lord Hugh Cecil. Major C. L. Storr and Sir Paul 
Harvey were joint secretaries.
29- Ibid., VI, 18.
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Cowdray told Admiral Hark Kerr in strictest confidence that 
the formation of the separate air service was in doubt.
Kerr, a member of the Air Board, was a specialist in German 
war production. Recent studies had convinced him that 
Germany wag giving the highest priority to production, of 
aircraft and submarines, With the ultimate goal of bombing 
and starving England into submission. Kerr immediately wrote 
a memorandum to Cowdray for circulation to the War Cabinet.
In it, he marshaled evidence to show that Germany was con­
centrating on production of submarines and large bombing 
aircraft. He wrote:
It is a race between them and us? every day lost is a 
vital danger. If the Germans get at us first, with 
several hundred machines every night, each one carry­
ing several tons of explosives, Woolwich, Chatham, 
and all the factories in the London district will be 
laid flat, part of London wiped out, and workshops in 
the southeast of England will be destroyed, and 
consequently our offensive on land, sea and air will 
come to an e n d . ^
To halt this, Kerr said, the British must begin at 
once to build a force to attack German production centers 
and air fields. This would require "the building of 2,000 
big bombing machines as a minimum, the training of pilots, 
preparation of aerodromes, the building of sheds, manufacture
30. Mark Kerr, Land Sea and Air (London: Longmans,
Green and Co., Ltd., 1927), pp. 289-91.
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of bombs, collection of t r a n s p o r t . O n l y  a separate 
Air Ministry could carry out this ambitious program, Kerr 
concluded.
Kerr's memorandum apparently had a decisive effect
32on the members of the War Cabinet. When they met again
on October 15, they agreed to make a cautious announcement ..
in Parliament that a bill would be introduced providing "for
33
the eventual setting up of an Air- Ministry." At the
same time an Air Policy Committee was formed with Smuts as
chairman to advise the Cabinet on air matters, pending the
establishment of an Air Ministry.
When Parliament convened on October 16, following
the summer recess, the members demanded immediate action on
34the air problem. As a result, when Bonar Law rose to make
the announcement agreed on by the War Cabinet, he irrevocably
committed the Government. "A bill to constitute an Air
Ministry has been prepared and will shortly be introduced,"
35he told the members. After that, there was no turning back.
When the bill was introduced on November 9, it went to 
a Parliament far more receptive than the Prime Minister had
31. Ibid. 32. Boyle, pp. 238-39.
33. Raleigh and Jones, VI, 19.
34. Ibid. ..
35. Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 
XCVIII (1917), 27-28.
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/■
believed possible. The Times noted that "the House warmly
approved /the/ argument that it was necessary to create an
authority whose exclusive duty should be to study and deal -
37with the general problems of war in the air. 1
Twenty days later, following a quick and smooth pas-
•30
sage, the Air Force Bill received the royal assent. °
Orders in Council were issued on December 21, 1917, and on
January 2, 1918, defining the composition and duties of the
members of the Air Council. The second of these orders
specified that the Air Council should come into being on
January 3, 1918, and designated Lord Rothermere, a newspaper
39
publisher, the first Secretary of State for Air. Members
of the Council included Henderson, as Vice-President; 
Trenchard# as Chief of the Air Staff; Kerr, as Deputy Chief 
of the Air Staff; Godfrey Paine, as Master-General of Per­
sonnel; Sefton Brancker, as Controller General of Equipment;
36. Lloyd George, IV, 122-23. See also Boyle, pp. 
238-39; and Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 
XCIX (1917), 126-183.
37. The Times (London), November 13, 1917, p. 7.
38. Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 
XCIX (1917), 2277.
39. Rothermere had succeeded Cowdray as President of 
the Air Board on November 17 following one of those curious 
political anomalies of the Lloyd George administration. On 
November 16, a letter appeared in The Times over the signa­
ture of Lord Northcliffe addressed to the Prime Minister, 
declining appointment to the new post of Secretary of State
80
Weir, as Director-General of Aircraft Production in the
Ministry of Munitions; Sir John Hunter, as Administrator of
Works and Buildings; and Major J. L. Baird, as Parliamentary
40
Under-Secretary of State.
Passage of the Air Force Bill and establishment of
the Air Council was a tribute to the genius of Smuts and
to the doggedness and perseverance of David Henderson.
The decision of 1914 which had permitted the fledgling Royal
Flying Corps to be split asunder was reversed. The world's
40first unified military air service, the Royal Air Force, 
began its journey through new and uncharted skies.
for Air. Cowdray, who had assumed that he would succeed to 
that post as the incumbent Air Board president, resigned and 
was replaced by Rothermere, Northcliffe's brother, and a 
press lord in his own right.
40. Raleigh and Jones, VI, 22.
41. The initials R- A. F. had long stood for the 
Royal Aircraft Factory. C. G. Grey greeted the selection 
of the new name for the combined air service as follows:
"At any rate now we know the worst. The glory of the names., 
of the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps, 
with their traditions of gallantry, chivalry, and self- 
sacrifice, are to be merged into initials which stand for 
everything that has been bad in military Aeronautics."
The Aeroplane, March 20, 1918, p. 1052.
CHAPTER VI
BEGINNING AND APPRAISAL
The Times greeted the birth of the Royal Air Force on 
April 1, 1918, with an editorial hailing the opportunity fpr
"practiced flying men to use their expert knowledge."'*'
Before the month was out, the leadership of the new service 
was split by internal dissension, and many of those "prac­
ticed flying men" had departed the Air Ministry.
The problems arose partly from the circumstances of 
the R. A. F.'s birth. The new service was the product of 
public pressure# ever increasingly applied to the national 
political leadership. Demands for a solution to the German 
air raid problem forced the politicians to act. Now, what 
they had created, they meant to control. At that point the 
political leadership--as represented by Lord Rothermere, the 
Secretary of State for Air-~ran head on into the iron-minded 
expression of the military will in the person of General 
Trepchard.
1. The Times (London), April 1, 1918, p. 2.
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The first ominous rumblings of the problems to come
were heard when Cowdray resigned as President of the Air
Board and was replaced by Rothermere. Paced with the task
of carrying out the amalgamation of the Royal Flying Corps
and the Royal Naval Air Service, Rothermere asked that
Trenchard be recalled from France to serve as the first
Chief of Air Staff, Trenchard resisted for a time, but
finally became convinced that he was the only senior air
officer who could solve the organizational problems. On
January 18, 1918, he surrendered command of the R. F. C. in
France to Major General J. M. Salmond and returned home to
2
the Air Council. It was a fateful decision. Almost from 
the first, there was conflict between the taciturn, incommu­
nicative air leader and the garrulous press lord and politi^- 
cian. Trenchard was dogmatic and precise. He was imbued 
with the military traditions of the Army and demanded adher­
ence to traditional procedures and strict compliance with the 
chain of command in dealing with subordinates. Rothermere, 
on the other hand, felt free to indulge his own ideas in the
2. Boyle maintains that Trenchard1s acceptance was 
due to his desire to protect Haig. Rothermere and Northcliffe 
threatened to launch a press attack against Haig if Trenchard 
did not accept the Air Council post. Andrew Boyle, Trenchard 
(London: Collins, 1962), pp. 250-52.
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organization of the new service,, When the Secretary insisted 
on consulting subordinate members of the Air Staff without 
bringing Trenchard into the discussions, the conflict boiled 
over. On March 19, 1918, following an exchange of acrimon­
ious correspondence between the two men, Trenchard resigned. 
The mighty German offensive launched against Haig's forces on 
March 21 delayed the inevitable for a few weeks, but on 
April 13 the resignation was accepted, and Major General F. H. 
Sykes was appointed to replace Trenchard as Chief of the Air 
Staff.^
Sykes was the first commander of the Military Wing of 
the R. F. C. in 1912. When the war began, he went to France 
as Henderson's Chief of Staff. However, after a dispute with 
Henderson, he was dismissed from that position. When Sykes's
3* Ibid., pp. 265-76. Lord Beaverbrook, a confidant 
of many of the leading political figures at the time, claims 
the dispute with Rothermere and Trenchard1s eventual resig­
nation were a part of the larger civil-military conflict 
which involved Robertson, Haig, Jellicoe, and the Prime 
Minister. Beaverbrook claims that Lloyd George believed the 
military leaders were conspiring with Asquith to replace him, 
and that he accepted Trenchard's resignation to strengthen 
his own hand. Lord Beaverbrook, Men and Power 1917-1918 
(New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1956), p. 222. Maurice
Hankey, the Secretary of the War Cabinet, disputes this.
"I was practically living with Lloyd George at this time.
. . . The Prime Minister was too engrossed in the life and
death problems of the moment to give much thought to the 
tiresome Trenchard business, which is mentioned only three 
times in my diary." Cited in Boyle, pp. 275-76. Certainly
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appointment was announced, Henderson resigned as Vice-Presi­
dent of the Air Council. He wrote to Bonar Law that his 
previous difficulty with Sykes was no secret, and he feared 
that he might become the focus point of discontent within 
the Air Ministry. "I am ready to admit that I earnestly 
desired to escape from the atmosphere of intrigue and false­
hood which has enveloped the Air Ministry for the last few
4
months," he concluded-
The resignations fed to a spirited attack in the
5
press which centered on Lord Rothermere. Mounting criti­
cism in Parliament seemed certain to lead to an inquiry, 
and in the face of this Rothermere sent his resignation to 
the Prime Minister and retired to his country home. When 
the resignation was announced on April 25, passersby were
Trenchard's well-known political naivetd makes it unlikely
that he would have taken part in any military junta seeking 
to overthrow the Prime Minister. For more on the civil- 
military dispute, a fascinating topic in itself, see Robert 
Blake, Unrepentant Tory (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc.,
1956), p. 368, and The Private Papers of Douglas Haig, 
1914-19 (London; Eyre & Spottiswood, 1952), p. 51, edited 
by the same author.
4. Cited in Beaverbrook, p. 378.
5. "The list is sts'adily growing, " wrote the Daily 
News "of acknowledged masters of their craft for whose ser­
vices in the crisis of our fate the government has no 
serious use. It is the story in every element. Thus: The 
Sea, Lord Jellicoe. The Land, Sir W. Robertson. The Air, 
Sir Hugh Trenchard." Cited in Beaverbrook, pp. 225-26.
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startled to see R. A. F. officers leaning from the windows
of the Hotel Cecil, waving newspapers and cheering. "What
is it, a victory in France?" someone shouted. "No, a victory
at home," a reveller at a window answered. "Lord Rothermere 
6
has gone."
A few days later Sir Henry Norman, an additional 
member of the Air Council appointed by Rothermere, also 
resigned. There the disintegration stopped.
As the war continued through the summer of 1918, 
Trenchard returned to command the Independent Air Force, the 
organization formed specifically to carry the war to the 
industrial heartland of Germany through the air. Under the 
plan for the Independent Air Force, all heavy bombers in 
France were withdrawn from the Squadrons of the R. A. F. 
operating with the Army, and were formed into new units and 
located at Ochey. The new organization was under the direct 
control of the Air Ministry in London. The Commander was to 
carry out bombing attacks against German cities without 
reference to the land war or to General Salmond, the R. A. F. 
commander in France whose activities were still linked
7
directly to the fortunes of the Army and the ground war.
6. Boyle, p. 281. 7. Ibid., pp. 288-96.
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The Independent Air Force was, then, in theory, the long- 
sought vehicle to move the war out of the trenches and into 
Germany. It was the agency which wpuld employ the Surplus 
Aircraft Fleet which Cowdrey and Weir had forecast, and which 
had influenced Smuts so greatly. It was the force which 
Mark Kerr had called for in his historic memorandum to the 
War Cabineto This organization, ideally, was the culmina­
tion of the protracted debate over air power which had con­
tinued throughout the war„
The official historian pinpointed the ultimate goal 
of the Independent Air Force and summarized the aspirations 
of those who fought for speedier development of the independ­
ent air weapon when he said that "no people on earth . » . 
can maintain the efficiency of its war activities under the
O
regular intensive bombing of its centres of population."
In five months of operation before the end of the 
war, the Independent Air Force dropped 550 tons of bombs 
behind enemy lineso^ At the Armistice, it had nine squad­
rons operating against German industrial centers and air
80 Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones, War in the Air 
(6 volSp and appendices? Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928-37)
I, 489.
9. "Fifty Years of Military Aviation, 1912-1962," a 
Chronology published by the Air Ministry (London: 1962),
p. 7.
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fields. But it had barely begun the operation for which it 
was c o n c e i v e d . L l o y d  George noted that "had the war per­
sisted a few months longer, we should have hurled ruin from
1(Hthe air on to the chief cities of Central Europe.
And what of Smuts's role in all this? Was his the 
correct solution to the air policy controversy? Formation 
of the Royal Air Force resulted from a political/ not a mili­
tary, decision. The decision was made by the Government in 
power in response fo intensive public pressure. The pressure
was the result of constant attacks on the Government's air
policies and the German air raids which had shaken the 
civilian population. But Smuts's decision was not merely a 
political expedient. It seems certain that this man with 
the keen, perceptive mind became fully convinced that to
carry the war through the air to the German heartland was
12the.one way to break the deadlock of the trenches. His-
acceptance of the Surplus Aircraft Fleet figures produced by
13
Cowdray and Weir has been criticized, but there is no cer-
10. J. A, Chamier, The Birth of the Royal Air Force 
(London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., 1943), p. 172.
11. David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd
George (6 vols.; Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1933-37),
IV, 103.
12. Above, p . 70.
13. Above, p. 75.
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tain evidence that he would not have made the same decision 
even had these figures not been available. Although the 
ambitious production estimates were not met immediately, by 
the end of the war the Royal Air Force was the strongest mil­
itary air service in the world. It owned over 22,000 air­
craft and maintained 133 squadrons and 15 flights overseas
and 55 squadrons at home. Nearly 300,000 men and women were
14
entitled to wear the new blue uniform.
But Smuts was not alone in his vision. From early
1915 the need to carry the war to the enemy, to use the air
as a strategic medium to break away from the stagnated
battles of the trenches, had been recognized. Smuts has been
1 5called the Father of the Royal Air Force ■and eulogized as
the founder of the basic concepts of air strategy above the
Italian, Guilio Douhet? the American, Billy Mitchell, and 
16Trenchard. Certainly his contribution was major. But
the honor--particularly that of Father of the Royal Air 
Force— must be shared with many others. There were the early 
advocates, Lord Beaulieu, the erratic Pemberton-Billing, and
14. "Fifty Years of Military Aviation, 1912-1962,"
p. 8.
15. Lloyd George, IV, 124.
16. E. J. Kingston-McGloughry, Global Strategy (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 216.
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even the cantankerous C. G. Grey, whose constant attacks 
forced the Government to recognize the crippling competition 
for material and the uncoordinated production effort which 
hampered the development of the air weapon. There was 
Murray Sueter, whose war-long goal was to be free of the 
restrictions placed on the air arm by the Admiralty; and 
Mark Kerr, another Naval airman whose important memorandum 
at the critical moment had such grreat influence on the War 
Cabinet's decision tp seek an Air Ministry. There were the 
young commahders and pilots of the R. F. C. and R. N. A. S.* 
who, in four years of war, progressed from complete ignor­
ance of air warfare to a shrewd understanding of the prin-
17ciples of the air battle. And there was, finally,
General David Henderson, without whose guidance and counsel 
Smuts might never have reached his decision.
Henderson's role was that of the military expert 
furnishing his own unique knowledge to the political lead­
ers. As a military officer, subordinate to civil authority, 
he could not go further in urging an independent air arm 
than his important memorandum to Smuts. In this, he
17. Sholto Douglas, Years of Combat (London: Collins,
1963), p. 13.
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followed the traditional role of the military professional
in a democratic society. Had he done otherwise, Henderson
might well rank with Smuts as the Father of the Royal Air
Force. Even Trenchard, who during the war criticized much
that Henderson did in England, acknowledged the debt which
18
the R. A. F. and the British people owe to this man.
That the decision made by Smuts and endorsed by the 
Government was the correct one cannot now be doubted. The 
military service which grew out of the political decision 
continued its part in carrying the long war to eventual 
victory. It survived post-war attacks by economy-minded 
men with no foresight and little hindsight. Twenty-two
t
years later it stood as the only bulwark between the island 
nation and a rejuvenated enemy bent once again on destroy­
ing England from the air. And finally, the Royal Air Force 
stood alone, victorious in the Battle of Britain, and a proud 
monument to those men who fought for its birth in another 
time and in another war.
18. Above, p. 75, n. 26.
APPENDIX I
THE SMUTS REPORT1
(Second Report of the Prime Minister's Committee on 
Air Organization and Home Defence Against Air Raids
dated 17th August 1917)
1. The War Cabinet at their 181st Meeting, held on 
11th July 1917, decided--
'That the Prime Minister and General Smuts, in 
'consultation with representatives of the Admiralty, General 
'Staff and FieId-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, Home Forces,
'with such other experts as they may desire, should examine—
'(1) The defence arrangements for Home Defence 
against air raids *
'(2) The air organization generally and the direc- 
'tion of aerial operations.'
2. Our first report dealt with the defences of the~ 
London area against air raids. The recommendations in that 
report were approved by the War Cabinet and are now in 
process of being carried out. The Army Council have placed 
at Lord French's disposal the services of General Ashmore 
to work out schemes of air defence for this area. We pro­
ceed to deal in this report with the Second Term of Reference: 
the air organization generally and the direction of aerial 
operations. For the considerations which will appear in the 
course of this roport we consider the early settlement of 
this matter of vital importance to the successful prosecution 
of the war. The three most important questions, which press 
for an early answer, are:
(1) Shall there be instituted a real Air Ministry 
responsible for all air organization and opera­
tions?
1. Cited in Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones, War in 
the Air (6 vols. and appendices,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1922-37), Appendices, 8-14.
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(2) Shall there be constituted a unified Air Ser­
vice embracing both the present Royal Naval Air- 
Service and Royal Flying Corps? And if this 
second question is answered in the affirmative, 
the third question arises--
(3) How shall the relations of the new Air Service 
to the Navy and the Army be determined so that 
the functions at present discharged for them by 
the Royal Naval Air Service and Royal Flying 
Corps, respectively, shall continue to be effi­
ciently performed by the new Air Service?
3. The subject of general air organization has in 
the past formed the subject of acute controversies which are 
now, in consequence of the march of events, largely obsolete, 
and to which a brief reference is here made only in so far 
as they bear on some of the difficulties which we have to 
consider in this report. During the initial stages of air 
development, and while the role to be performed by an Air 
Service appeared likely to be merely ancillary to naval and 
military operations, claims were put forward and pressed 
with no small warmth, for separate Air Services in connexion 
with the two old-established War Services. These claims 
eventuated in the establishment of the Royal Naval Aircraft 
Service and Royal Flying Corps, organized and operating on 
separate lines in connexion with and under the aegis of
the Navy and Army respectively, and provision for their 
necessary supplies and requirements was made separately by 
the Admiralty and War Office and to provide a safeguard 
against the competition, friction, and waste which were 
liable to arise, an Air Committee was instituted to preserve 
the peace and secure co-operation if possible. When war 
broke out this body ceased to exist, owing to the fact that 
its Chairman and members nearly all went to the front, but 
after a time it was replaced by the Joint War Air Committee. 
The career of this body was, however, cut short by an absence 
of all real power and authority and by political controver­
sies which arose in consequence. It was followed by the 
present Air Board, which has a fairly well-defined status 
and has done admirable work, especially in settling type 
and patterns of engines and machines and in coordinating 
and controlling supplies to both the Royal Naval Air Service 
and Royal Flying Corps.
4. The utility of the Air Board is, however, severely 
limited by its constitution and powers. It is not really a 
Board, but merely a Conference. Its membership consists
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almost entirely of representatives of the War Office, 
Admiralty, and Ministry of Munitions, who consult with each 
other in respect of the claims of the Royal Naval Air Ser­
vice and Royal Flying Corps for their supplies. It has no 
technical personnel of its own to advise it, and it is depen­
dent on the officers which the departments just mentioned 
place at its disposal for the performance of its duties.
These officers, especially the Director-General of Military 
Aeronautics, are also responsible for the training of the 
personnel of the Royal Flying Corps Service. Its scope is 
still further limited in that it has nothing to do either 
with the training of the personnel of the Royal Naval Air 
Service or with the supply of lighter-than-air craft, both of 
which the Admiralty has jealously retained as its special 
perquisites. Although it has a nominal authority to discuss 
questions of policy, it has no real power to do so, because 
it has not the independent technical personnel to advise it 
in that respect, and any discussion of policy would simply 
ventilate the views of its military and naval members. Under 
the present constitution and powers of the Air Board, the 
real directors of war policy are the Army and Navy, and to 
the Air Board is really allotted the minor role of fulfill­
ing their requirements according to their ideas of war 
policy. Essentially the Air Service is as subordinated to 
military and naval direction and conceptions of policy as 
the artillery is, and, as long as that state of affairs 
lasts, it is useless for the Air Board to embark on a policy 
of its own, which it could neither originate nor execute 
under present conditions.
5. The time is, however, rapidly approaching when 
that subordination of the Air Board and the Air Service could 
no longer be justified. Essentially the position of an Air 
service is quite different from that of the artillery arm, 
to pursue our comparison; artillery could never be used in
war except as a weapon in military or naval or air opera­
tions. It is a weapon, an instrument ancillary to a ser­
vice, but could not be an independent service itself. Air
service on the contrary can be used as an independent means 
of war operations. Nobody that witnessed the attack on 
London on 11th July could have any doubt on that point.
Unlike artillery an air fleet can conduct extensive opera­
tions far from, and independently of, both Army and Navy.
As far as can at present be foreseen there is absolutely no 
limit to the scale of its future independent war use. And 
the day may not be far off when aerial operations with their
94
devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and 
populous centres on a vast scale may become the principal 
operations of war, to which the older forms of military and 
naval operations may become secondary and subordinate.■ The 
subjection of the Air Board and service could only be justi­
fied on the score of their infancy. But that is a disability 
which time can remove, and in this respect the march of 
events has been very rapid during the war. In our opinion 
there is no reason why the Air Board should any longer con­
tinue in its present form as practically no more than a con­
ference room between the older services, and there is every 
reason why it should be raised to the status of an indepen­
dent Ministry in control of its own war service„
6. The urgency for the change will appear from the 
following facts. Hitherto aircraft production has been insuf­
ficient to supply the demands of both Army and Navy, and the 
chief concern of the Air Board has been to satisfy the neces­
sary requirements of those services c But that phase is 
rapidly passing. The programme of aircraft production which 
the War Cabinet has sanctioned for the following twelve 
months is far in excess of Navy and Army requirements. Next 
spring and summer the position will be that the Army and Navy 
will have all the Air Service required in connexion with 
their operations; and over and above that there will be a 
great surplus available for independent operations. Who' is
to look after and direct the activities of this available 
surplus? Neither the Army nor the Navy is specially compe­
tent to do so; and for that reason the creation of an Air 
Staff for planning and directing independent air operations 
will soon be pressing. More than that: the surplus of
engines and machines now being built should have regard to 
the strategical purpose to which they are going to be put.
And in settling in advance the types to be built the opera­
tions for which they are intended apart from naval or mili­
tary use should be clearly kept in view. This means that 
the Air Board has already reached the stage where the settle­
ment of future war policy in the air war has become neces­
sary. Otherwise engines and machines useless for independent 
strategical operations may be built. The necessity for an 
Air Ministry and Air Staff has therefore become urgent.
7. The magnitude and significance of the transforma­
tion now in progress are not easily realized. It requires 
some imagination to realize that next summer, while our 
Western Front may still be moving forward at a snail's pace 
in Belgium and France, the air battle-front will be far
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behind on the Rhine, and that its continuous and intense 
pressure against the chief industrial centres of the enemy 
as well as on his lines of communication may form an impor­
tant factor in bringing about peace. The enemy is no doubt 
making vast plans to deal with us in London if we do not 
succeed in beating him in the air and carrying the war into 
the heart of his country. The questions of machines, aero­
dromes, routes, and distances, as well as nature and scope 
of operations require careful thinking out in advance, and 
in proportion to our foresight and preparations will our 
success be in these new and far-reaching developments. Or 
take again the case of a subsidiary theatre; there is no 
reason why we may not gain such an over-powering air super­
iority in Palestine as to cut the enemy's precarious and 
limited railways communications, prevent the massing of 
superior numbers against our advance, and finally to wrest 
victory and peace from him. But careful staff work in ad­
vance is here in this terra incognita of the air even more 
essential than in ordinary military and naval operations 
which follow a routine consecrated by the experience of cen­
turies of warfare on the old lines.
The progressive exhaustion of the man-power of the 
combatant nations will more and more determine the character 
of this war as one of arms and machinery rather than of men. 
And the side that commands industrial superiority and 
exploits its advantages in that regard to the utmost ought 
in the long run to win. Man-power in its war use will more 
and more tend to become subsidiary and auxiliary to the full 
development and use of mechanical power. The submarine has 
already shown what startling developments are possible in 
naval warfare. Aircraft is destined to work an even more 
far-reaching change in land warfare. But to secure the 
advantages of this new factor for our side we must not only 
make unlimited use of the mechanical genius and productive 
capacity of ourselves and our American allies, we must 
create the new directing organization, the new Ministry and 
Air Staff which could properly handle this new instrument 
of offence, and equip it with the best brains at our dis­
posal for the purpose. The task of planning the new Air 
Service organization and thinking out and preparing for 
schemes of aerial operations next summer must tax our air 
experts to the utmost and no time should be lost in setting 
the new Ministry and Staff going. Unless this is done we 
shall not only lose the great advantages which the new form 
of warfare promises but we shall end in chaos and confusion,
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as neither the Army ox Navy nor the Air Board in its present 
form could possibly cope with'the vast developments involved 
in our new aircraft programme. Hitherto the creation of an 
Air Ministry and Air Service has been looked upon as an 
idea to be kept in view but not to be realized during this 
war. Events have, however, moved so rapidly, our prospec­
tive aircraft production will soon be so great, and the 
possibilities of aerial warfare have grown so far beyond 
all previous expectations, that the change will brook no 
further delay, and will have to be carried through as soon 
as all the necessary arrangements for the purpose can be _ 
made.
8. There remains the question of the new Air Ser­
vice and the absorption of fhe Royal Naval Air Service and 
Royal Flying Corps into it* Should the Navy and the Army 
retain their own special Air Services in addition to the air 
forces which will be controlled by the Air Ministry? This 
will make the qonfusion hopeless and render the solution of 
the air problem impossible. The maintenance of three Air 
Services is out of the question, nor indeed does the War 
Office make any claims to a separate Air Service of its 
own. But, as regards air work, the Navy is exactly in the 
same position as the Army; the intimacy between aerial scout­
ing or observation and naval operations is not greater than 
that between long-range artillery work on land and aerial 
observation or spotting. If a separate Air Service is not 
necessary in the one case, neither is it necessary in the 
other. And the proper and, indeed, only possible arrange­
ment is to establish one unified Air Service, which will 
absorb both the existing services under arrangements which 
will fully safeguard the efficiency and secure the closest 
intimacy between the Army and the Navy and the portions of 
the Air Service allotted or seconded to them.
9. To secure efficiency and smooth working of the 
Air Service in connexion with naval and military operations, 
it is not only necessary that in the construction of air­
craft and the training of the Air personnel the closest 
attention shall be given to the special requirement of the 
Navy and the Army. It is necessary also that all Air units 
detailed for naval or military work should be temporarily 
seconded to those services, and come directly under the 
orders of the naval or army commanders of the forces with 
which they are associated. The effect of that will be that 
in actual working practically no change will be made in the 
air work as it is conducted to-day, and no friction could
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arise between the Navy or Army commands and the Air Service 
allotted to them®
It is recognized, however, that for some years to 
come the Air Service will, for its efficiency, be largely 
dependent on the officers of the Navy and Army who are 
already employed in this work, or who may in the future 
elect to join it permanently or temporarily* The influence 
of the Regular officers of both services on the spirit, 
conduct, and discipline of the present air forces has been 
most valuable, and it is desirable that the Air Board should 
still be able to draw on the older services for the assis­
tance of trained leaders and administrators. Further, it is 
equally necessary that a considerable number of officers 
of both Navy and Army should be attached for a part of their 
service to the Air Service in order that naval and military 
commanders and Staff Officers may be trained in the new arm 
and able to utilize to advantage the contingents of the air 
forces which will be put at their disposal. The organization 
of the ait force therefore should be such as to allow of the 
seconding of officers of the Navy and Army for definite 
periods-^not less than four or five years--to the Air Ser­
vice. Such officers would naturally after their first 
training be chiefly employed with the naval and military 
contingents in order to secure close co-operation in air 
work with their own services. In similar fashion it would 
be desirable to arrange for the transfer of expert warrant 
and petty or non-commissioned officers from the Navy and Army 
to the new Service.
10. To summarize the above discussion we would make 
the following recommendations g
(1) That an Air Ministry be. instituted as soon as 
possible, consisting of a Minister with a consul­
tative Board on the lines of the Army Council or 
Admiralty Board, on which the several depart­
mental activities of the Ministry will be repre­
sented. This Ministry to control and administer 
all matters in connexion with aerial warfare of 
all kinds whatsoever, including lighter-than-air 
as well as heavier-than-air craft.
(2) That under the Air Ministry an Air Staff be 
instituted on the lines of the Imperial General 
Staff responsible for the working out of war 
plans, the direction of operations, the collec­
tion of intelligence, and the training of the air 
personnel; that this Staff be equipped with the
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best brains and practical experience available 
in our present Air Services, and that by period­
ical appointment to the Staff of officers with 
great practical experience from the front, due 
provision be made for the development of the 
Staff in response to the rapid advance of this 
new service*
(3) That the Air Ministry and Staff proceed to work 
out the arrangements necessary for the amalgama­
tion of the Royal Naval Air Service and Royal Fly­
ing Corps and the legal constitution and dis­
cipline of the new Air Service, and to prepare 
the necessary draft legislation and regulations, 
which could be passed and brought into opera­
tion next autumn and winter.
(4) That the arrangements referred to shall make 
provision for tbe automatic passing of the Royal 
Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps per­
sonnel to the new Air Service, by consent, with 
the option to those officers and other ranks who 
are merely seconded or lent# of reverting to their 
former positions.
There are legal questions involved in this 
transfer# and the rights of officers and men must 
be protected, but no dislocation need be anti­
cipated,
(5) That the Air Service remain in intimate touch 
with the Army and Navy by the closest liaison, or 
by direct representation of both on the Air 
Staff# and that, if necessary, the arrangements 
for close co-operation between the three Services 
be revised from time to time.
(6) That the Air Staff shall, from time to time, 
attach to the Army and the Navy the air units 
necessary for naval or military operations, and 
such units shall# during the period of such attach­
ment, be subject, for the purpose of operations,
to the control of the respective naval and mili­
tary commands. Air Units not so attached to the 
Army and Navy shall operate under the immediate 
direction of the Air Staff.
The air units attached to the Navy and Army 
shall be provided with the types of machines 
which these services respectively desire.
©
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(7) That provision he made for the seconding or loan
of Regular officers of the Navy and Army to the
Air Service for definite periods, such officers 
to he employed, as far as possible, with the 
naval and military contingents.
(8) That provision be made for the permanent transfer
hy desire, of officers and other ranks from the
Navy and Army to the Air Services.
11, In conclusion, we would point out how undesirable
it would he to give too much publicity to the magnitude of
our air construction programme and the real significance of 
the changes in organization now proposed. It is important
for the winning of the war that we should not only secure
air predominance, hut secure it on a very large scale; and 
having secured it in this war we should make every effort 
and sacrifice to maintain it for the future. Air supremacy 
may in the long run become as important a factor in the 
defence of the Empire ae sea supremacy. From both these 
points of view it is necessary that not too much publicity 
be given to o u f  plana and intentions which will only have 
the effect of spurring our opponents to corresponding 
efforts, ^he necessary measures should be defended on the 
grounds of their inherent ^hd obvious reasonableness and 
utility, and the desirability of preventing conflict and 
securing harmony between naval and military requirements.
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